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THE PROBLEMS
OF
HINDU PHILOSOPHY



BY

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To
My
Father.

PREFACE

This is an attempt to present to the general reader in a simple form, the problems of Philosophy as they are regarded and solved in some of the well known Schools of Hindu Philosophy. The views of the great European Philosophers on the same problems, that have been placed side by side with those of the Indian Sages will enable the reader to compare the products of philosophical speculations in India and in Europe. The author will consider himself amply rewarded if his efforts succeed in stimulating his reader to a deeper study of the said systems of philosophy. Portions of this book appeared in the Wednesday Review in the form of an essay.

City College, Calcutta }
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AUTHOR

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THE PROBLEMS OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY

INTRODUCTION.

THE first and natural tendency of human mind is to act without questioning itself. In the beginning of mental life man fails to perceive the distinction between mind and matter. But action without reflection must give rise to error and man falls into error and when he becomes conscious of this he directs his thought not to external things but turns it upon itself. And as soon as he begins to reflect upon his own thought to speculate as to its value he is compelled to meet the most formidable of all philosophical problems. What is the relation between mind and matter?

Every system of philosophy is a direct or an indirect answer to this question. Some philosophers deny the existence of matter and others the existence of mind but all try to explain the apparent dualism which the observation of things seems to impose on us. Those who deny the

HINDU MATERIALISM.

The Charvaka System is the only system which can be classed as materialistic. It assumes that the only source of true knowledge is perception by the senses. "It maintains that the four elements of earth, air, fire and water, are the original principles of all things, and they are eternal. It represents intelligence as resulting from a modification of the aggregate of these elements, when combined and transformed into the human body, just as the power of inebriation is produced by the mixing of certain ingredients. The faculty of thought, according to it, is destroyed when the elements from which it arises are dissolved. There is no soul apart from the body—the soul is only the body distinguished by the attribute of intelligence. The various phenomena of the world are produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things and there is nothing supernatural—no God, no fate even, no other world, no final liberation, no recompense for acts. Prosperity is heaven and adversity is hell and there is no other heaven or hell. The so-called sacred books—the three Vedas—were composed by rogues or buffoons. The exercises of religion and the practices of asceticism are merely a means of livelihood for men devoid of intellect and manliness.

The sole end—the only reasonable end—of man is enjoyment —

‘ While life remains let a man live happily,
let him feed on ghee, even though he runs
in debt

When once the body becomes ashes, how
can it ever return again ?

Materialism is unphilosophical as it rests entirely upon hypothesis and conjecture. Have we any evidence for the assertion of Mr. Lawrence, that “medullary matter thinks” It fails to explain the harmonies of the physical universe and the properties of vegetable and animal life. It fails to explain the mind of man his moral principles and his religious convictions. It fails therefore to satisfy our intellect and our heart, the true life of which consists in faith and hope, reverence and love.

MATERIALISM AND FORCE

If matter is the only self-existent substance then what is the relation of matter to force ? Dr. Lowenthal holds that force is not essential to matter but is the result of its aggregation. But aggregation can never explain force it presupposes force. Faraday holds that matter is force, Grove tells us that force is an affection of matter.

Dubois Reymond holds that 'force is nothing else than an abortion of the irresistible tendency to personification', Professor Moleschott declares that 'force is essential to matter' Professor Spiller declares that 'no material constituent of body is originally endowed with force' Dr Winslow affirms that matter is a mere vehicle which possesses and holds force as a bladder holds water or a sack meal' Professor Balfour Stewart maintains that that which changes the state of a body, whether that state be one of rest or of motion is force', Professor Barker asserts that it is motion itself, and Dr Bastain understands by force a mode of motion

Thus we see that materialism has no reasonable account to give of force The materialists maintain that the force is either inherent in matter or it co exists with matter from all eternity, or matter is essentially active or matter and force are inseparable But all this explanation if explanation it can be called at all, is opposed to science and reason

Materialism assumes at the outset that matter is absolutely and in itself just what it appears to the senses to be which it calls the commonsense view of matter and to the senses it appears as a reality existing by itself outside and independent of mind and as extended in space but divisible

into parts, and these parts are assumed to be ultimate and indivisible and indestructible. And all things are assumed to be formed by the combination and permutation of the self-existent things viz earth air &c. But these things occupy space, move through space, and resist motion through space and have position in space. Therefore materialism has to assume empty space also as another self-existent reality. It is also said that the combination and recombination of these self-existent things give rise to all the things of the universe. But there can be no combination or separation without force. Where does this force come from? Therefore force also has to be assumed as self-existent. Then again these self-existent things must have been so situated and related to each other from the beginning as to produce by their interaction and combination just this particular world and no other. How this original collocation to be accounted for? Hence it has also to assume the collocation and position in relation to each other of the self-existent things and compound bodies constituting the world.

MATERIALISM AND COSMOS

How does materialism explain the origin of the physical cosmos? The early materialists thought

that this world is the result of fortuitous combination of atoms. They supposed that an infinite number of atoms falling through infinite space for infinite time collide and thus stick together by chance and thereby form innumerable fortuitous combinations. This sort of chance combination gives rise to the things of the world. The modern materialists however well acquainted as they are with the structure of the world and the forces operating in it maintain that the forces are not only acting on matter from without but also operating from within the atoms themselves.

The materialists while explaining the origin of the physical cosmos do not go further back than the origin of the Solar System. They explain the origin of the Solar System by means of nebular hypothesis. The present Solar System existed according to them at a very remote period as a nebula or vast cloud of dust or vapour. This vapour how and why it is not known began to revolve and condense towards the centre, and as it condensed it threw off or left behind it rings or streaks of vapour which condensed into planets including the earth. The condensed interior became the sun and so on. •

MATERIALISM AND LIFE

Materialism is obviously unproved so long life has not been shown either to be a property or an effect of matter. As a matter of fact, it has not yet been shown to be either the one or the other. Consistently with the materialistic principles the living organism must be explained as an exceedingly delicate and complicated mechanism of physical and chemical forces. All the processes of a living body must be explained as mechanism.

It was long maintained that in addition to the physical and chemical forces there is another force separate from both, which is known as special life force or vital force and which works in every organism. But the materialistic physiologists hold on the contrary that there is no such force as the vital force and that the force of the living body is the ordinary physical and chemical force of the laboratory.

But how on materialistic principles can we possibly account for all the different forms of the living organism—for all the different species of plants and animals? This is commonly done by Darwin's Theory of Evolution by fortuitous combinations and natural selection.

Movements are continually going on among the particles of matter. These movements give

rise to all kinds of fortuitous combinations, some of these fortuitous combinations are of the kind called protoplasm and this protoplasm manifests in an elementary way the properties of life. As this protoplasm is extremely variable as it is exposed to the external forces and as it is constantly being acted on and influenced by the circumstances in which it is placed it takes innumerable forms and shapes. Of these fortuitously assumed forms some are favourable to permanence and self preservation and some are not. Those which are favourable survive in the struggle and the rest perish. Thus out of all forms of living organisms those most suited to existence are gradually sifted out or selected by natural conditions in the course of ages while those which are less fitted and unfavourable either perish of themselves or are killed out by their most successful rivals in the struggle for existence.

Some such theory as this, then, is supposed in materialism as the basis of explanation of the origin of living beings. But Darwin himself did not go so far back and did not profess materialism. He supposes two or more primitive simple germs at the beginning into which God 'breathed the breath of life' and all plants and animals have developed from these by fortuitous modification and natural selection.

Biology has not yet succeeded in giving us a precise and accurate notion of life. Schelling says that it is the 'tendency to individuation', according to Richerand, it is 'a collection of phenomena which succeed each other during a limited time in an organised body'. De blainville affirms that "life is the two fold internal movement of composition and decomposition at once general and continuous", Lewes maintains that "Life is a series of definite and successive changes both of structure and composition which take place within an individual without destroying its identity". Mr Herbert Spencer, says professor Bain, arrives at the following highly complex definition

- 1 Life contains a process or processes of *change*
- 2 The change is not a simple or individual act but a *series or succession of changes*
- 3 Life involves a plurality of *simultaneous* as well as successive changes
- 4 The changes are *heterogeneous* or various in character
- 5 The various changes all *combine* to a *definite* result
- 6 Finally, the changes are in *correspondence with external co existences and sequences*

In short Life is a set of changes simultaneous and successive combined to a definite result and in correspondence with external circumstances Or in a briefer form Life is the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations So carefully has the comparison been conducted that no exception could be taken to any part of this definition Every one of the particulars occurs in all living bodies and in no kind of dead matter" But this definition while aiming to define life leaves life wholly out of account It enumerates several characteristics which in no way can be called the special and distinct characteristics of life for these characteristics can be observed in the action of a watch as well as in that of a plant or animal

There is an hypothesis which holds that the life did not originate on this earth but has come to it from remote and older worlds This hypothesis has been presented in two forms —

1 According to M Edger Minet professor Preyer and Dr O Zacharias life is not fixed and limited to certain points of space or periods of time is of a cosmical not of a terrestrial nature has been coeval with the universe has passed from nebula to nebula, and has been derived by the earth from the mass whence it was itself detached Professor Preyer indeed imagines that

living and organic existences preceded and deposited all dead and inorganic matter. Even when not urged in this burlesque shape the view that life has come to the earth from the mass whence it was severed seems untenable. Contemporary science is very far astray if your planet has not passed through a condition in which its temperature must have been fatal to all life.

2 According to S W Thompson and Helmholtz life may have been carried to our earth in the clefts or crevices of meteoric stones—the fragments of shattered worlds, once rich in vital forms.

This hypothesis does not explain however, the origin of the world but only gives a suggestion viz its explanation must be sought in a region which is far beyond this world.

The hypothesis of spontaneous generation or now as it is often termed 'abiogenesis' may be regarded as scientific. It was formerly assumed that the lowest forms of life viz bacteria or bacilli which cause putrefaction and fermentation and some how or other connected with infectious disease originate spontaneously. But Pasteur and Tyndall and many others proved experimentally that if the living germs containing in air and water be rigidly excluded then no bacteria appear and no putrefaction follows. Thus they proved

that living germs do not originate spontaneously but from previously existent germs

The hypothesis that life originates from matter cannot be maintained either by science or by reason, materialism fails to bridge over the gap between the dead and the living. Science must needs a power—a power which is not present in matter—to explain and account for life

THEORIES OF LIFE

Life is the principle of explanation with the Ionics. They regarded the cosmic matter as something in itself *living*, they thought of it as animated, just as are particular organisms. Their doctrine is known as Hylozoism. According to Aristotle every being is the union of matter and form. Matter is the substratum which becomes this or the other, it is the subject of change. The form is that which makes of matter a particular determinate or real thing, it is the perfection the activity the soul of the thing. As the soul is the end of the body it cannot be called a material undeterminate thing. It is the form of a special body whose life individuality and organisation it constitutes. With Leibnitz also life is the principle for explaining Nature. His doctrine is *vitalism*. But a life is a unity in variety.

The mechanical theory of Leibnitz led him to the conception of infinitely many individual forces metaphysical points as likewise to the idea of their continuous connection. He had originally leaned toward the atomic theory of Democritus and the nominalistic metaphysics; the Occasionalist movement and above all the system of Spinoza, made him familiar with the thought of the All Unity; and he found the solution as Nicolaus Cusanus and Giordano Bruno had found it before in the principle of the *identity of the part with the whole*. Each force is the world force, the cosmic force, but in a peculiar phase, every substance is the world substance, but in a particular form. Hence Leibnitz gives to the conception of *substance* just this meaning: it is unity in *plurality*. This means that every substance in every state 'represents' the multitude of other substances and to the nature of 'representing' belongs always the unifying of a manifold. Life is the central conception of Schelling's philosophy of nature. Schelling makes an attempt to consider nature from the point of view of the *organism* and he tries to understand the connection of its force from the ultimate end of the production of organic life.

As a matter of fact a mechanical explanation

of the organism has not yet succeeded or we may go so far as to say with Kant that it is impossible in principle. Life can be explained only through life. An archæologist of Nature may trace the genealogy of life. he may explain, according to mechanical principles the origination, of one species from another but he must stop with original organisation for, mere mechanism of inorganic matter is not sufficient for its explanation.

MATERIALISM AND MIND

Materialism breaks down when it comes to deal with mind. No satisfactory or reasonable explanation has yet been found of a process by which matter passes into consciousness. It ignores the distinction between mind and matter. Matter is that which occupies space, offers resistance and has the attribute of extensivity. mind is that which does not occupy space, does not offer resistance and has the attribute of consciousness. Mind and matter are utterly contrasted and they can never be compared. Prof Bain holds that they are the two sides of a double faced unity. But how two diametrically opposite qualities can cohere in a single substance ? Materialism fails to explain the unity of consciousness and the consciousness of personal identity. Materialism is irreconcilable

with the self consciousness of man with his internal spontaneity or self activity and with his moral feelings

PROF TYNDALL ON MATERIALISM

' The passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable. Granted that a definite thought and a definite molecular action in the brain occur simultaneously, we do not possess the intellectual organ nor apparently any rudiment of the organ which would enable us to pass by a process of reasoning from the one phenomenon to the other. They appear together but we do not know why. Were our minds and senses so expanded strengthened and illuminated, as to enable us to see and feel the very molecules of the brain, were we capable of following all their motions all their grouping all their electrical discharges if such there be; and were we intimately acquainted with the corresponding states of thought and feeling—we should probably be as far as we were from the solution of the problem. How are these physical processes connected with the facts of consciousness? The chasm between the two classes of phenomena would still remain intellectually impassable.'

life reposes! The evolutionist must allow that these verdicts of the moral faculty, be their genesis what it may, are as valid as are any judgments of the intellect. The moral discernment rests on as solid a foundation as the intellectual perceptions. Now apply the doctrine that the determinations of the will—the faithfulness of St John and the treachery of Judas alike—are the necessary effect of atomic movements of matter. They simply indicate a certain molecular action of the matter in a corner of the brain. Their moral approval or condemnation, the joy of one who has triumphed over a temptation, the remorse of one who has betrayed the innocent are the veriest folly. A man who maliciously shoots his neighbour has no more occasion to blame himself for the deed than has a horse who destroys a man's life by a kick. Men call such an animal, in figurative speech, a vicious animal and if materialism is true, there is no other kind of vice possible to a human being. Tyndall in one of his late productions, argues that this doctrine of molecular ethics is perfectly consistent with the application of motives for the purpose of inducing men to act in one way rather than another. These motives it is implied, are forces brought into the scale that the beam may rise on the opposite side. This is the statement which fatalists of every time are for

ever making. But the point insisted upon is not the freedom of the will as found by direct consciousness although this evidence of man's moral freedom is incontrovertible, but the phenomena of moral approval and disapproval of guilt, self accusation and remorse are the facts demanding some explanation which shall not destroy their reality in the very act of attempting to explain them. Here it is that the materialistic psychology breaks down. Nor can it be said that this is opposing a doctrine by merely pointing out its mischievous consequences. The affirmations of conscience referred to as putting to rout the advocates of materialism are as truly perceptions and judgments as are any of the propositions that result from the exercise of the senses or the understanding. If materialistic evolution, as predicated of moral action be true the rational nature is at war with itself. There is an insoluble contradiction in human intelligence itself, which no sophistical juggle of words can avail to cover up, much less to remove." G. Fisher

HINDU DUALISM

The Sankhya System may be regarded as a dualistic system. It regards that soul and nature are two self-existent substances. But absolute independent substances can have nothing in

common and therefore one cannot act upon the other. Therefore the question arises. How can nature seize upon the soul and make it develop into mental powers? How can the action of nature produce sensation and intelligence in the soul when it has nothing in common with matter? This system holds that no new production is possible, if that be the case then sensation and intelligence cannot be regarded as new production, they must have existed before they were manifested. But where did they exist? Does Kapila think that they were latent potentially in the soul? But how can they remain latent in the soul when it is held that they do not belong to it but are imposed upon it? Nature, it is said acts blindly and unintentionally, but how blind, unintentional action can produce such intelligence and sensation? Of course Kapila here assumes with Schopenhauer and Hartmann the existence of unconscious purpose but he cannot call it with them "unconscious ideation," because his *Prakriti* has nothing mental in it. What is the state of the soul before feeling and intelligence were imposed upon it by nature? What will be the state of the soul when it has cast off what nature imposed upon it? Can that state be called the state of blessedness when there is neither pleasure nor pain, neither intelligence nor consciousness? These are the difficulties of Hindu Dualism.

Dualism affirms the reality of two ultimate and independent substances viz spirit and matter. But the question arises as to the relation of mind and matter soul and body. What must the soul be in order that it may know matter and what must matter be in order that it may be known by mind. Only like can act upon like. But mind and matter are two opposite substances. how can then action and reaction between them be possible? Descartes assumes that such action and reaction are possible between them. Malebranche the precursor of the Associationists applies the theory of Occasional causes to external perception. Spinoza holds that the divine substance reveals itself in two parallel attributes—thought and extension. To every mode of extension there corresponds a mode of thought. Leibnitz makes external perception depend on Pre established Harmony. All these philosophers made an attempt to explain the problem but with very little success. There can be no direct action of matter on mind. They admitted that a direct reciprocal influence between two unrelated substances is impossible.

• HINDU IDEALISM

The central idea in the Vedanta System is that there is only one real being and that this being is absolutely one. The world of things and minds

is but emanations from this sole entity. Any thing which seems to have independent existence of its own is due to ignorance. Brahma alone exists, he is the only real being, everything else is illusion. Brahma is the one eternal unlimited pure and perfect being. If there existed a multitude of realities which had an origin and an end which were finite compounded and imperfect they must have originated in Brahma. But this they could not have done it is argued, unless Brahma had within himself the real principle of multiplicity limitation, or in other words unless he were really not one not eternal not perfect. To ascribe real being and individuality to anything but Brahma is equivalent to denying that Brahma is Brahma. Nor can there be any qualities and distinctions in Brahma. The absolute unity must be at once absolute reality and absolute knowledge. Were absolute being and absolute knowing not identical there could be no absolute identity no being absolutely one. Brahma the universal soul is the absolute knowledge which is inclusive of and self identical with reality. But absolute knowledge cannot be the knowledge of anything for this implies the distinction of subject and object which is of itself a limitation both of subject and object. Absolute knowledge must exclude the dualism of subject and object and every kind of synthesis and relation.

Thus we see that Philosophy is an attempt to attain an intelligible conception of the world system as a whole—a conception which will be free from error and self contradiction, which will explain to us the different parts and aspects of the world as they are open to our experience

The object of Philosophy is, then, to give us an understanding of the different contents and factors of the world *viz* mental and material things, to explain their nature and contents, to explain their relations, and to show the end or purpose which they serve as factors of the world system

Philosophy begins only when men begin to enquire into the reason of things to enquire into the end or purpose which they serve as factors of the world system Science does not enquire into the reasons of things but into their causes Science determines what things are what are the constituent elements of things, it determines how things are as they are what are the laws according to which the things work, and it determines why things are as they are what are the causes according to which the things work Science ignores the question of Final Cause or Teleology, Philosophy accepts it and determines it

Man is progressive and hence his conception of the world as a whole like any other

conception is progressive. It has undergone a continual modification and development—it has assumed different forms at different times and places and each of these different forms is a different Philosophy and hence there are as many philosophies as there are conceptions of the world system as a whole, but all these philosophies are not so many different philosophies. They are the products of mind which grows and develops and hence they are but successive stages in the development of one philosophy. But why this apparent plurality? This apparent plurality is due to the fact that man has a natural inclination to look at only one aspect of things at the exclusion of the rest and to take that one aspect for the whole. He looks at only one aspect of things which somehow or other excites his curiosity, explains it and puts forth his explanation—which is but an explanation of a part—as an explanation of the whole. Thus Charvaka tries to explain the world under the analogy of mechanism. He assumes that the world is just as it appears to our senses. The sense-world is the real world, it is the real fundamental existence because it is what is most vividly impressed on our consciousness. This system makes no distinction between mind and matter or more properly the question of such distinction does not occur at all. How the world

is known? What is mind which knows it? What is the relation between the knowing mind and the world known?—Questions like these the Charvaka System does not properly deal with. This System is primitive and child like. The children take the things to be what they appear and never ask the questions Why they appear so? How they are known? What is it which knows them. In short, Charvaka fails to notice the distinction between mind and matter. Nevertheless it must be admitted that it is a philosophy as it is an attempt to explain the origin and development of the world and to find out the primordial principles from the different elements of nature as observed by our senses.

But materialism will give rise to scepticism, for it holds that perception sensuous perception is the only source of knowledge. Knowledge must be confined to our senses it cannot transcend our senses—it cannot go beyond our senses. Hence we can know nothing of the nature of things. We can know the things not as they are in themselves but as they appear to us. The moment we try to get beyond the sensations we find ourselves, confronted by contradictory and equipollent reasons which prevent all affirmation. Thus the Madhyamikas deny all knowledge of substantiality and make things only fleeting appearance, both subject and object of thought.

are nothing to them but products of the process."

But man cannot rest satisfied with scepticism for it cannot satisfy the reason of man. Man cannot think that his knowledge is confined to senses that he cannot go beyond his senses as Charvaka maintains. Hence the Nyaya system refutes the assertion of the Charvakas that truth is impossible because inference is an illusory ground of belief. The Nyaya System maintains that truth is attainable and by logical inference the nature of soul and world and God and the destinies of soul can be determined. Thus scepticism must have its reaction and as the result of reaction we get the Nyaya System the Sankhya System the Vedanta System &c. In Europe we find that Greek scepticism was followed by the school of Alexandria, the scepticism of the 16th century gave rise to the vast dogmatic system of Descartes. Voltaire's scepticism and the criticism of Kant were followed by the great German school of Idealism.

Thus we see that every system looks at a particular aspect of the explanation of the world system and takes that particular aspect to be the entire explanation of the whole. Thus Spinoza looked at the world under the aspect of extension and thought he could explain the world system as a whole by the application of the method of geometry. Descartes and Spencer and the materialists

try to explain the world under the analogy of mechanism ; the Eleatics and the Vedantists look only at the *oneness* or the unity of the world and ignore its diversity and plurality as illusions ; Leibnitz and Herbert, on the contrary, think only of the plurality of monads or reals and take no heed of the unity underlying it . Berkeley thinks of mind and idea and explains the world as a system of ideas ; Hume and Mill think only of sensations and explain the world-system as a system of sensations, actual and possible.

We see then that philosophers have a tendency to exaggerate one aspect of things at the exclusion of the rest and hence it is that they produce so many opposite theories . But a true philosophy will be a system which will explain and reconcile all the opposite theories, which will harmonise monism and pluralism, idealism and materialism —because no one of them is absolutely wrong, no one of them is absolutely right.

THE SCOPE OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY

Religion is the soul and life-blood of the Hindus . They have a strong conviction in future life and in the immortality of the soul . They think that the happiness of this earthly life will sink into nothingness when compared with the happiness in heaven . But how to attain that happiness ? It can

be attained by a discriminative knowledge of the Self or Ego and it is the chief aim of Hindu Philosophy to chalk out the lines for human beings by which it can be attained

There are six schools of Hindu Philosophy—the Sankhya, the Nyaya, the Vaisheshika the Patanjali the Mimamsa and the Vedanta—of which only the three important systems will be discussed in this book. Kapila is the author of the Sankhya System Goutama of the Nyaya System, Konad of the Vaisheshika System Patanjali of the Patanjali System Jaimini of the Mimamsa System and Vjasa of the Vedanta System. All these systems aim at devising means of attaining *Tattva jnana* in order that Liberation, which is the common object of all, can be realised.

Perfect happiness or beatitude is the summum bonum of all the six systems of Hindu Philosophy. The approaches that lead to this summum bonum vary no doubt but all systems aim at determining them. The Hindu philosophy is no doubt a theory of knowledge but it is recommended not for the sake of knowledge only but for the realisation of the highest purpose *vis* Salvation. Thus philosophy seeks to direct human life for the realisation of the highest end but it must base its authoritative commands on the realities of existence. The question of man's highest good

depends on his place and end in the world-system and hence it is also necessary for philosophy to determine the place and position of man in the world system. Therefore, it is also the business of philosophy to determine the form origin and meaning of the world as a whole and the place, purpose, position and destiny of man as factor of the world whole. What are we? Whence come we? Whither go we? What have we to do? What may we hope for? These are the questions which philosophy seeks to answer

THE CHARVAKA SYSTEM.

CHAPTER I

Philosophy

In the Charvaka System we find the combination of the materialistic metaphysics of Democritus and Empedocles with the sensationalism and scepticism of the sophists and the ethical materialism of Aristippus

Philosophy is an attempt to understand the world system as a whole, to determine our place, purpose, position and destiny in this system. What are we? Whence come we? Whither go we? What have we to do? These are the questions which philosophy seeks to answer and the Charvaka System makes an endeavour to answer these questions in its own way

But Philosophy is either Empirical or Rational. Empirical Philosophy is a theory of the world, on lines purely empirical : *e.*

in terms of sensations, possible and actual Rational Philosophy is a theory of the world as concrete reality of substance and phenomena. The Charvaka System is an empirical Philosophy, it explains the world or makes an attempt to explain it in terms of sensations, it is an effort to construct a conception of the world as it would manifest itself to our senses or to those of others constituted like ourselves.

We find in the Greek Philosophy—that Thales, the head of the school of Miletus, the father of the Ionian School holds that *water* is the fundamental principle, the universal substratum from which the universe is derived that Anaximander, the disciple of Thales holds that the *infinite atmosphere* is the mother of heavens and the worlds, that Anaximenes, the disciple of Anaximander holds that *air* is the generative principle of which other bodies are merely modifications, that Heraclitus, the Obscure, of Ephesus holds that *fire* is the primordial element from which every thing is derived and to which every thing must return, and that Emped

ocles holds that we must not endeavour to derive air from ether, water from air, earth from water but we must consider these four elements as equally original

But what do we find in the Charvaka System ? We cannot conceive that fire can become air , or air can become fire We can not conceive that fire can become water or water can become fire and so on , hence we must think that the four elements—earth, air, water, fire—are the self-existent principles and their permutations and combinations produce an infinite variety of bodies Such is the metaphysical doctrine of the Charvaka System

Democritus makes an attempt to derive these principles which Charvaka calls self-existent from anterior atoms, but Charvaka makes no such attempt, nor does he think it necessary Democritus explains this universe by means of space and atoms—the empty and the full The atoms in number infinite, move in space infinite, giving rise to worlds infinite These atoms are eternal, are imperishable, are self-existent

These four elements, according to the Charvaka System, become transformed into organism when mixed together in certain proportion and order. This complex intermixture of elements in the organism produces our thinking power in the same way as the mixture of certain ingredients in liquid produces intoxicating power. Thus our soul is the resultant of the intermixture of the material elements—it is only the function of our organism ; it exists so long as our body exists and ceases to exist when body also ceases to exist. Death is mere separation of the elements and life the combination of them. This system is distinct from that of Democritus in this that Democritus regards the soul as only a body within the mind made of more delicate atoms—the soul is not the function of body but the body itself—a very refined sort of the body.

Empedocles also holds with Charvaka that all these four elements are equally original ; but he raises an important question which does not occur to Charvaka *vis.* Do these elements move of their own accord

or do they receive an impetus from a higher force? Charvaka says that the combination and recombination of these elements give rise to life and mind, but how do they combine and recombine? What is it that makes them work in such a way? Charvaka leaves the question unanswered. Democritus, however, explains the movements of these material principles by two immaterial principles—Love, the principle of union and Hate, the principle of separation. First Love unites them and forms them into a single spherical body. Then Hate comes in and causes separation in them and thereby produces the earth, the ocean, the atmosphere, the heavenly ether and the stars. Then comes the period of struggle—struggle between Love and Hate and the result of this struggle is the origination of plants, animals and men. Thus attraction and repulsion giving rise to evolution and devolution, creation and destruction are continually going on.

All these four radical elements are represented in man: the solid parts of his body

represent the earthly element, the liquid parts of his body, the watery element, the vital breath, the airy element and lastly we may say that his spirit represents the fiery element. Love it is that makes him intellectually superior to all, for, Love it is which unites in him all the cosmical elements and earth, air, water, fire, these are all the cosmical elements. He is superior to all, because he perceives all and he perceives all because he is *all*—he perceives solid and liquid and air and fire because he is all these

CHAPTER II

Psychology

Mind according to the Charvaka System is a stream of consciousness—an aggregate of conscious states, and processes—an aggregate of feeling, thinking and willing, and this consciousness exists so long our body exists, for, body is the condition of mind. Thought and volition are only refined and pure sensation and sensation is the

impression produced by images which emanate from external objects. There can be no knowledge that is not expressible in terms of sensation and feeling which are the channels of experience.

A system like this tends necessarily to sensationalism and scepticism. It holds that matter is the sole source the sole substance of the universe. What is sensation then? It is the impression of matter on matter and thought is nothing but an elaboration of this sensation. It is a power to apprehend the reality underlying sensation. But if sensations be nothing but impressions of matter on matter, if we cannot apprehend the realities underlying and manifested in them and if we cannot use them as means and materials for arriving at knowledge of the world and of the self then what can we know of matter? Is there any heat or cold out of relation to feeling any bitter or sweet out of relation to the sense of taste, any colour independent of sight any sound independent of the sense of hearing? In short, whatever we

know we know only sensation but sensation is not matter. Thus it is evident that a system like this must contain within itself the germs of its own contradiction and destruction

CHAPTER III

Ethics

The problem of ethics presupposes the solution of the philosophical and psychological question as to the nature of the self. But the nature of the self depends on the philosophical view which we take of the cosmos as a whole. If we view the cosmos as wholly phenomenal having no permanent foundation or rational basis, the self also must be viewed as a series of phenomena, as a series of ever changing states, and the highest good of such a self must consist in pleasure, in the gratification of sensibility. On the other hand, if we regard the cosmos as wholly real, as substance underlying the phenomena which are mere changes, mere illusions or

maya, then the self also must be regarded as a real substance of which the manifold desires and affections are but illusory modes and the highest good of such a self must consist in annihilating these desires and affections. Then again, if the cosmos be regarded as a synthesis of phenomena and noumena, if both of these be real, then the true good must consist in a reconciliation of the co-ordinate claims of both sensibility and rationality.

Charvaka views the cosmos as wholly phenomenal and the soul as a series of conscious states. What am I myself? Charvaka says, "I am my body." And this is made manifest in the habit of speaking of our body as ourselves as when we say "I think", 'I am stout', 'I am dark' &c—here by "I" evidently we understand our body. But do we not say 'My body?' and when we say 'my body' do we not separate the body from the 'I'? The answer is that this is only a metaphor.

This conception of self of Charvaka corresponds with that of a child. A child

identifies his self with his physical organism because he sees that his body is the immediate source of his pleasure and pain, that it is the channel through which he receives his sense affections from the external world, and that his limbs, the instruments of his will are always with him, but his toys and tools and companions are often wanting

Since man exists only for a time since his life is transient and temporary having no reality of permanence or any absolute dignity, his only end is to make the best possible use of his existence, and the best possible use of existence consists in seeking the excellence of life and the excellence of life can be attained only by enjoying it to the utmost and the real enjoyment is pleasure of the senses

Hence pleasure is the highest good of life But how pleasure can be the highest end of life when we see that pleasure is never pure, never free from pain ? This reminds us of the Epicurean paradox that more we seek pleasure the less we gain it But because there is pain and because pleasure is mixed with pain should we therefore reject our life ?

On the other hand we should exercise our intelligence and devise means of avoiding and suppressing pains. Thus we see that this system admits though in a very subordinate way unlike the extreme hedonists of the West the need of a regulative principle.

Charvala's Ethics is in accord with the principles of Aristippus. Pleasure is according to Aristippus the ultimate aim of life. But we must be moderate in indulgence we must control ourselves in the presence of the allurements of sense and we must control the vulgar instincts of our nature.

Pleasure is the good is the cry of nature. The animals know no other principle of action than pleasure. the children are sensitive to pleasure only. the grown man apparently grave and sober seeks and pursues pleasure. the virtuous man enjoys pleasure in the cultivation of virtue and even those who refute that pleasure is the object of desire find pleasure in such refutation. Mill holds that what is desired is necessarily desirable that only pleasure is desired, and that desire of pleasure and experience of pleasure

are absolutely the same thing looked at in two different ways. Locke holds that things are good or evil in reference to pleasure and pain. What increases or causes pleasure or what directly or indirectly diminishes pain is called good. D. Sidgwick holds that good is identical with the excellence of human existence, that the excellence of human existence is identical with the excellence of conscious life and that the excellence of conscious life is identical with pleasure.

Thus we see that it is admitted, even by the noble schools of philosophy that pleasure is a good but opinions differ as to the question, whether it is the sole good, the true good the whole good—whether it is a condition of good or the consequence of good. That pleasure without bounds without choice without foresight can never be the highest end of life, for such pleasure is self-contradictory and falls before its own consequences, is admitted even by the voluptuous morality of the Charvaka System which is apparently so seductive.

CHAPTER IV

Optimism

IT is held by the pessimists that this world is but—

One desert

Barren and cold on which the wild waves break

But nothing rests save carcasses and wrecks

Reefs and the salt surf & weeds of bitterness

Charvaka does not deny the existence of evil in this world but he holds that if we use intelligence rightly and properly there will be a balance of pleasure and life would be worth living from hedonistic point of view—and this is the optimistic conclusion of the Charvaka System. Charvaka does not hold with Buddha that evil is the very essence of existence, that this world is a vale of tears and that there is nowhere true peace and secure happiness but holds on the other hand that life can be enjoyed and the enjoyment of life consists in seeking pleasure and though pleasure is a mingled one yet balance of pleasure can be secured by the application of a regulative principle.

Schopenhauer, however, holds that the

balance can never be on the side of pleasure because the conscious life is essentially pain. This life is necessarily and hopelessly wretched and wretchedness always outweighs felicity. A man can never be happy except when he is either inebriated or deluded. But Charvaka does not sing with Lord Byron—

“Count o’er thy joys thine hours have seen,
Count o’er thy days from anguish free,
And know, whatever thou hast been,
’Tis something better not to be”

He does not say that life is a continued deception, that it is full of incessant toil and constant care, that earthly happiness is destined to be frustrated or to be recognised as an illusion but holds on the other hand, that it is a thing which can be enjoyed, which can be desired only if we care to be a little reflective, sober and intelligent

CHAPTER V

Atheism

Our soul is a function of matter and this life is the be all of our existence. Death is disintegration of the material elements and life their integration. There is no such thing as future life, no such thing as heaven or hell. By heaven we mean only enjoyment of pleasure and by hell mere endurance of pain. There is no such thing as God, the supreme author and governor of the world, but the only god is the earthly king, the ruler of a state, the arbiter of right and wrong in society. When we die we do not enter into the region of pain, of darkness unrelieved by a single ray of light and hence our religious ceremonies our endeavour to propitiate the gods, to satisfy them by prayers and offerings are vain and illusive. Religion is the invention of individuals desirous of deceiving their fellowmen in order to further their own selfish and ambitious views.

Epicurus almost holds the same view with Charvaka. It is possible, says Epicurus, that there are certain gods but they are supremely happy beings, they are free from passion and favouritism and human weaknesses. The miseries of humanity cannot move them, nor can they exert any influence on the life and work of man. Hence offerings and prayers and ceremonies have but little influence on them.

Death is not an evil at all according to Charvaka as well as Epicurus. Death cannot be an evil to the person who is dead because he has no feelings then. Death cannot be an evil to the living for it does not yet exist for them. We never feel the icy touch of death because it never comes to us. Hence we must not make our life miserable by self created worries and anxieties. We must not deceive ourselves by foolish fears of death which never comes to us and we must not refrain from enjoying our life to our heart's content. Let us enjoy pleasure and pleasure alone, for, pleasure is the only thing which is true and good.

In this way the Charvaka System frees mankind from the bondage of religion and terrors of death and thereby it holds that it is a boon to mankind.

CHAPTER VI

Theory of knowledge

Now the question is Are these principles as established by Charvaka contrary to sound reasoning? True it is that these principles are founded on the observation of facts of sense-perception, on the observation of things and events as they present themselves to our senses. But should we always appeal to the evidence of senses as the one ultimate and decisive test of truth for everything coming within the range of experience? Has not *inference*, which extends the range of knowledge and belief beyond the range of experience to things past, distant, and future, nothing to do with the acquisition of knowledge? Is not *authority* a convincing source of belief? Does not a great part of our beliefs rest directly on authority or testimony? Is it

not a fact that every one of us assimilates the accumulated beliefs of the society in which he lives and moves and has his being, on the authority of his ancestors and contemporaries? In fact, observation, inference and testimony are the intellectual grounds of knowledge

It is held that mind is a collective term for the states and processes of feeling thinking and willing which constitute the stream of consciousness. This system does not enter into the question regarding the substance of mind or reality which manifests itself in these mental phenomena. It aims more at the accumulation of facts than at the understanding of them. It aims more at knowledge and utility than at theory and logical completeness of system.

Hence James J. S. Mill Bain and Spencer hold almost the same opinion with Charvaka. They regard mind as nothing more than the aggregate of sensations and feelings imposed from without. These associate themselves together and revive each other as ideas, in clusters and series. What

is thought then ? It is nothing more than spontaneous coming and going, spontaneous rising and sinking of those ideas by virtue of the laws of associations. To understand and elaborate those sensations no self is needed, and as a matter of fact the self is nothing more than the product of these sensations themselves. The working of the mind is the automatic mechanism of the sensations.

Charvaka holds that mind is an aggregate of states and activities. But can we think of states and activities without thinking of something of which these are the states and activities ? Can we think of feeling, thinking and willing without something which feels, thinks and wills ? We cannot stop with facts but we must go beyond them. When we see smoke we infer at once that there is fire. In the same way when we observe facts of experience we are compelled to infer that there is soul or substance underlying these facts and such inference also becomes corroborated by the evidence of authority.

But Charvaka raises the question. What

is the value of inference ? How can its conclusion ever be certain ? The most elementary conclusion supposes three terms. A conclusion is a relation between two terms and in order to establish this relation it is necessary to compare these two terms with one another by means of a third which is called the Middle Term. In the premises each of the two terms is compared separately with the Middle Term, and in the conclusion they are compared with one another. Thus we see that three terms are necessary—two Extremes the subject and the predicate of the conclusion, and the Middle Term with which these two Extremes are compared. The subject of the conclusion is called the Minor Term and the predicate of the conclusion the Major Term. To draw a conclusion it is necessary that the Middle Term must be universally and unconditionally connected with the Major and the Minor Term : *i. e.* the Middle Term must be distributed. But how do we know that the connection between the Major and the Middle is necessary and universal ? What

warrants us in establishing such necessary and universal connection ? It is perception or inference or testimony or comparison or what ?

CHAPTER VII.

Perception.

Perception cannot prove such universal connection for perception gives us knowledge of particular facts. We can perceive a thing which is present but we cannot perceive things, past, distant and future ; hence perception gives us knowledge of 'here', and 'now', but no knowledge of 'there', and 'then', but such knowledge cannot be called universal. Perception gives us knowledge of particular facts : visual perception gives us knowledge of colour only ; tactual perception of touch only ; auditory perception of sound only ; and so on. But knowledge of particular facts cannot give us knowledge which is universally and necessarily true. For, universal truth goes infinitely beyond anything that the eye or ear or any other sense can give, goes infinitely beyond the

range of our experience. Hence it is evident that perception cannot give us any necessary connection between the Major and the Minor.

But perception, it may be urged, is of two kinds. Internal perception in which mind apprehends its own phenomena and external perception in which it apprehends the phenomena of the external world. External perception derives its knowledge through the senses and internal perception without the senses. Perception when it depends on our senses gives us knowledge of particular things and thereby fails to give us knowledge necessary and universal, but what, if it does not depend on senses? Does it still fail to give us knowledge of universal and necessary truth? Charvaka would meet this argument with Comte and Mill by saying that there is no such thing as internal perception or intuition of universal truths there is no such thing as introspection or self consciousness as Reid and Hamilton suppose. Mind can directly observe and study all phenomena except its own. Observation of mental states is not possible for that would imply that mind

can perform two things at the same time—it can observe and be observed—it is both the subject and the object at the same time—but this is impossible

CHAPTER VIII

Inference

But if perception fails to establish a necessary connection between the two terms, cannot inference which is another source of knowledge establish it ? What is inference then ? Inference itself depends on a universal proposition as premise—premise establishing a necessary and universal connection between two terms—Syllogism supposes that one of the premises must be universal for nothing can be inferred from particular premisses. But whence do we get this universal proposition ? The possibility of this universal proposition is just the thing which requires proof. We have seen that perception cannot prove it. Inference too cannot prove it for inference assumes it and depends on it. To say that such a universal

connection makes inference possible and inference makes possible such universal connection involves a *circulus in defenendo*. Therefore the conclusion is that even inference is barren to produce a universal proposition.

Mill, Bain and Spencer also hold with Charvaka that there are no universal propositions that are intuitive or self-evident and none that can be known to be necessarily and universally true. They are notwithstanding their apparent necessity and generality and self-evidence really inferences from observed particulars—they are true so far as our experience goes and the so called universal propositions differ from other propositions simply in this that they are based on larger number of facts

CHAPTER IX

Authority. *

Testimony or authority also cannot prove the necessary connection, for, testimony itself must depend on some grounds and

these grounds must be either perception or inference but we have seen that neither the one nor the other can establish a necessary and universal connection. Hence, absolute certainty can never be founded on authority. Even if we suppose that testimony can convey universal truth, yet, we can have no knowledge of such universal truth, for such knowledge implies the testimony of a person who knows the universal truths. But where to get such a person? Can any and every person be regarded as our authority? To admit this is to admit that any person knows the universal truth and can bear testimony to it. But is not this *petitio principii*? Charvaka refuses to accept the *ipsi dixit* of Manu.

CHAPTER X

Comparison

Lastly we are to show that comparison also cannot be the criterion of testing the universality and necessity of a proposition. Comparison must be the comparison of parti-

culars and from particulars we cannot rise to the universal without middle terms and inference. Induction by simple enumeration can give no necessary connection. Of course, the scholastic logicians made induction entirely enumerative. This doctrine was universal amongst logicians till the time of Bacon. Bacon says about Induction "*per Enumerationem Simplicem*," "*ubi non reperitur instantia contradictoria*" i. e. it is induction because we have never found an instance to the contrary. The conclusion of such an induction can never be taken as certain. Charvaka says with Bacon that such an induction is a childish matter to be refuted by a negative instance—hence such an induction can never give a universal conclusion.

In order to make our induction scientific it is necessary that we must introduce an idea of causality. We must assume that causation is the universal and necessary truth. But Charvaka denies with Mill all necessary truth.

CHAPTER VI

Universal Proposition

But what are we to understand by the universal if perception or inference or testimony or comparison fails to give us any knowledge which may be regarded as universal? Charvaka would deny that the universal has any real objective existence as the schoolmen believed, or that it is an intelligible synthesis of the common essential attributes as the conceptualists including Kant, Mansel, Dr Ward and Mr Stout hold but would hold with Hobbes Berkeley and Professor Bain that universal notions are mere matters of words that a class is constituted by its name alone and that name is the only general element

J S Mill holds a modified view which makes an approach to conceptualism. We have a concrete representation, certain of the component elements of which are distinguished by a mark (i.e. the class name) designating them for special attention, and this attention, in cases of exceptional intensity, excludes all consciousness of the

others " "There is always present a concrete idea or image, of which the attributes comprehended in the concept are only, and cannot be conceived as anything but a part."

Again by a universal proposition we mean not only that the proposition must be general and accurate and certain but we also mean that the connection between the two terms is unconditioned, does not depend on any conditions external to themselves. If a proposition depends on external conditions we cannot accept it as universal until and unless we know that the conditions are universally present. But how to know that the conditions are universally present if they be beyond the range of our perceptions if they be inaccessible to our senses? And even granting that they are the objects of perception how perception can help us in proving that they are universal, for, perception tells us what is true in particular cases only? Hence to know that the conditions are present universally it is necessary to have recourse to inference, but we have seen that even inference depends on a previous

premise, universal and unconditional Hence the vicious circle again

All universal conclusions involve a vicious circle Knowledge of a universal conclusion involves knowledge of a universally present condition To know 'All man is mortal' it is necessary to show that mortality is causally connected with the essential nature of man which always remains the same or in other words it is necessary to know the condition which makes humanity and mortality to be universally connected Hence our argument amounts to this—There is a universally present condition which makes humanity and mortality always connected And again humanity and mortality are connected therefore there must be a universal condition which makes them so connected But this is arguing in a circle In short, universal conclusion supposes universal premise and that again another universal premise and that another and so on up to infinity Therefore the conclusion is that there can be no universal conclusion if we do not intentionally commit the fallacy of arguing in a circle

What is the psychological disposition of our mind when we by seeing smoke infer the presence of fire. Such an inference is not really based on a universal connection between fire and smoke. Charvaka says with David Hume that after the constant conjunction of two objects, we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other. We observe that there is a constant connection between fire and smoke and we are accustomed to infer the existence of one from the existence of the other. Such an inference is merely an act of analogy. Mill also holds the same view that inference is from particulars on the ground of analogy.

Charvaka holds that there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses and hence knowledge of necessary connection and necessity is not possible. Our knowledge is confined to our senses we cannot transcend the limits of our senses, we cannot form any conception of substance or soul or God or of any form of spiritual existence. Thus we see that

the Charvaka System negatives the metaphysical doctrines and accepts their negation as the justification of its Hedonistic Ethics. But though this system is inconsistent with metaphysics still it has a peculiar metaphysics of its own viz, the materialistic metaphysics and on this it grounds its Materialistic Hedonism.

CHAPTER XII

Conclusion

Materialism—atheistical materialism—of Charvaka was intended to alter all our institutions and to abolish those which he disliked. It is held by some that Brihaspati himself was the author of the Charvaka System and he produced this work simply to mislead the Asuras.

The continuity of the history of materialism was at no point completely broken although for a considerable time materialism was feeble and unpopular. The atomism of Democritus the sensationalism of the sophists, the ethical materialism of Aristippus

even if He exists, His existence cannot be demonstrated, that the world is self-existent, that man has no original sin to expiate, that his memory and reason are like the heat and light of fire, that he lives in flesh after death only in the flesh of the child that he begets, that he lives intellectually after death only in the deed which immortalises him, that hope of reward and fear of punishment in a future life for his present conduct are groundless, that moral good and evil are not absolute and intrinsic and incontestable but are rather nominal and relative and arbitrary, and that man can ensure his life against the risks of the world by obeying the law of self preservation which is within him and which emanates from matter

We can never hope that a time will come when materialism will altogether vanish away from the face of the earth, we can never hope that a time will come when man, however perfect his mind may be, however perfect his education may be, will be, more influenced by the unseen than the seen, will be more

THE SANKHYA SYSTEM.

CHAPTER I

Four Categories

This system begins with an elaborate classification of all the existent things into four classes or categories—into what is evolvent and nothing else, into what is both evolute and evolvent, into what is evolute only without being evolvent, and lastly into what is neither evolute nor evolvent

All possible things must come under one or other of the above categories. Let us now examine the categories and see what things come under each of the categories —

1 What is evolvent only

Prokṛti is evolvent only, it is productive nature, it is *natura naturans*, it evolves or produces things without being itself produced by anything, it is the absolute, the root evolvent, the primary being—

being which is the source of all the things which we experience in the world.

Goodness and darkness are the factors of Prokriti. Goodness moves it to act and darkness means want, or defect which has to be overcome in the realisation of the good. To realise the good it is necessary to remove the want, to rectify the defect, to avoid resistance. Goodness prompts it to activity—activity to remove darkness.

Prokriti must be regarded as the ultimate self-existent substance in order to avoid the fallacy of infinite regress of cause and effect.

2. What is both evolute and evolvent.

What are those things which are evolved and produced and also evolve and produce other things—which are both producers and the produced—which are both passive and active? "Great One" is the principle which is both passive and active, both evolute and evolvent—it is passive, because, it is produced by the absolute evolvent, hence it is evolute; it is active, because, it produces effects of its own and hence it is evolvent.

This great one, by which we may mean intellection or reason, being stimulated by goodness produces the five Buddhendriyas—the organs of perception, and the five Karmendriyas—the organs of action, and it also produces the mind itself with egoism or personality which is the unity or we may say the common product of all the preceding

Prokriti or Nature is itself undeveloped—it is self existent, but it evolves the "Great One," the power of unconscious intellectual production which we may also call the unconscious reason in nature. This unconscious reason, some way or other, lays hold of finite souls which are also self existent and makes them develop into self conscious minds. It is unconscious nature that makes the soul develop into conscious mind and reason, it is the unconscious force of nature which acts on the soul, makes it conscious and imposes mentality upon it from without. True it is that Prokriti itself is unconscious yet it produces by her inherent capacity an unconscious reason called the "Great One."

This view of Sankhya reminds us of Schopenhauer's "unconscious will" and Hartmann's "unconscious reason." According to Schopenhauer unconscious will is the first cause of the world. The moving force of nature is will without consciousness. It operates blindly and automatically but yet does not produce its results by *chance* but by some *unconscious automatic preadaptation* analogous to instinct. Consciousness is the latest product. Hartmann admits the presence of ideas every where which guide the blind force of nature towards its end but denies the existence of consciousness either above or in nature. He bases his theory on *unconscious ideation*.

3 What is evolute without being evolvent

What are those things which are only products but do not produce anything? This category includes the five gross elements and the eleven organs •

But is it always the case that the gross elements are always produced and never produce any thing? Take earth, for instance

Does it not produce jars and pots? The answer is that it is not earth which produces them but a power which uses the earth as its material and this power is the rational force

4 What is neither evolute nor evolvent

What is such a substance? It is soul. It neither evolves nor is evolved, It is self-existent, it is eternal, it is subject to no development. The mental powers of sensations and actions are not natural to soul,—it may exist without them—but the great power which is the first product of Prakṛiti by its unconscious intelligence, makes the soul to be an intelligent and conscious being so that it may become conscious of Prakṛiti or Nature

CHAPTER II

Twenty Five Tattvas

The Sāṅkhya System aims to make impossible human pain by arresting the course of transmigration which it holds can be

done by the knowledge of twenty five elements of things and categories of intelligence, which may, however, be all reduced to nature and soul. It expresses the relations of the twenty five principles to one another in the following formula : "Nature, root of all, is no product, seven principles are products, and productive; sixteen are products only; soul is neither a product nor productive"

The following are the twenty-five elements —

I. There are eight Prokrities—primary and productive elements —

- (1) Prokṛti as Avyakta—the non-differentiated or undeveloped principle
- (2) Buddhi, Intellect
- (3) Ahaṁkāra, the subject
- (4) The *five* Tanmatras, Essences

II. There are sixteen Vikaras or modifications —

- (1) The *five* Buddhendriyas—the perceptive organs
- (2) The *five* Karmendriyas—the active organs

- (3) Manas—the central organ or mind
- (4) The *five* Mahabhutas—the material elements

III The Purusha—Spirit or Self.

Now we shall proceed to give an analysis of the above elements without entering into their detailed description

CHAPTER III

Prokriti as Avyakta

It is the nondifferentiated and undeveloped principle. It is a pure *noumenon* and has no phenomenon. By phenomenon we mean only the appearance or manifestation, it is generally applied to some sensible appearances, more particularly to those of nature, the causes of which are not immediately obvious—as the phenomena of light, of heat, of electricity &c. In mental philosophy it is applied to the various and changing states of mind—as the phenomena of feeling, thinking and willing. In the philosophy of Kant, it is an object such as we represent it to

ourselves or conceive of it, in opposition to *noumenon* or a thing as it-is in itself. Phenomena are the manifestations or appearances, but can there be manifestations or appearances without a thing which manifests or appears? We will not enter into the discussion of this question, but as Prakriti has neither beginning, middle, nor end, nor as it has any parts, it cannot be apprehended by the senses; it is inaudible; it is intangible; it is invisible, indestructible and it is eternal. It is without savour, without odour. The following are the chief characteristics of the Avyakta Prakriti.

- (a) It is the Prodahana Brahman—the primordial principle of the universe.
- (b) It is Pura—or abode of all things.
- (c) It is Dhruba—or unchanging.
- (d) It is Prodhanaka or chief—it is common to all things.
- (e) It is Akshara—It is indestructible.
- (f) It is Ksetra, field or object.
- (g) It is Tamas—darkness.
- (h) It is Prasuta—productive.

CHAPTER IV

Buddhi, Intellect

What is Buddhi ? It is Adhyavasāya or ascertainment, it is that through which we ascertain things it is that which gives us conviction (Protipatti) of things. It is through Buddhi that we know that this is a rupee and not a pice, that this is a man and not a horse.

It is a debated question whether Buddhi is used in its Subjective or Psychological sense or cosmic sense. Max Muller holds that "Buddhi or Mahat must here be a phase in the cosmic growth of the universe, like Prakriti in the beginning and the sense and other organs of the soul and however violent our proceeding may seem we can hardly help taking this great principle the Mahat, in a cosmic sense. Now the first step after Avyakti the undeveloped dull and as yet senseless Prakriti, can only be Prakriti or lighted up, or rendered capable of perception and no longer dull matter

If taken in a psychological sense, it supplies, no doubt, in a later stage the possibility of individual perception also, or of the determination of this and that. But originally it must have been meant as *Prokṛiti* illuminated and intellectualised, and rendered capable of becoming at a later time the germ of *Āhankāra* (distinction of subject and object) *Mānas*, mind, and *Indriyas*, apprehensive senses. Only after *Prokṛiti* has become lighted up or perceptive, only after mere material contact has become consciousness, can we imagine the distinction, whether general or individual, between subject and object (*Āhankāra*) and their new relation as perceiver, and perceived as "I" on one side and 'this' and 'that' on the other."

Buddhi is of two kinds viz *Sattvika* and *Tamāsika* and these again may be further classified thus—

A The *Sattvika* Buddhi is of four kinds—

- (i) Dharma, virtue
- (ii) Gnana, knowledge
- (iii) Vairagya dispassionateness

and (iv) *Aisvarya*, superhuman power

B The Tamasika Buddhi is also of four kinds is

- (i) Adharma vice
- (ii) Agyana ignorance
- (iii) Anuraga, passion

and (iv) Powerlessness

Now these are the eight manifestations of Buddhi. What is Dharma? It is the opposite of Adharma. It consists in obeying the laws enjoined by Sruti and Smriti—revelation and tradition. But why should we follow the laws of the Shastras? Is an action good because tradition holds it to be so or tradition holds it because it is good? Why should we obey the laws of God? Is an action good because God wills it or God wills it because it is good? Blind obedience to laws is not morality, is not Dharma. Dharma must be in accordance with the practice of the best people and happiness would be its reward.

Next we come to Gnan or knowledge which is the opposite of Agyana or ignorance. It is an understanding—

- (a) of the twenty five subjects—
Tattvas

(b) of the states of thought—Bhava
and (c) of the elements—Bhuta

Knowledge consists in apprehending the real meaning and significance of these things

Then, vairagya which means dispassionateness and which is the opposite of passionate-ness. The self is always being acted on and influenced by the external objects such as sound, smell, taste, touch and Vairagya consists in not being dependent on and acted upon by the external things

And lastly Aisvarya which means super human power and which is the opposite of powerlessness

Thus we see that when Buddhi becomes dominated by purity i.e. Sattva Guna it assumes the following forms, or Rupas —

- (a) Virtue, 'through which there takes place going upward',
- (b) Knowledge, 'through which there arises liberation',
- (c) Dispassionateness, through which men are absorbed in Prakriti
- and (d) Superhuman powers* 'through

which there comes unfettered movement'

And when it is dominated by darkness or Tama Guna, it gives rise to the following forms—

- (a) Vice, through which deterioration takes place ,
 - (b) Ignorance, through which there arises bondage ;
 - (c) Passion, which leads us far astray from Prakriti ,
 - and (d) Powerlessness, which fetters our movements
-

CHAPTER V.

Ahamkara

What are we to understand by Ahamkar ?
 ' It is Abhimana, assumption or misconception, and this consists in the belief that I am in the sound, i.e. I hear, I feel, I see I taste, and I smell, I am lord and rich, I am Isvara, I enjoy, I am devoted to virtue, by me a man was slain, I shall be slain, by powerful enemies &c ' These hearing, feeling, seeing,

tasting, smelling &c do not pertain to me at all but to Prakriti

There are several modifications of Ahamkara which are as follows —

- (1) The Vaikarika (modifying) Ahamkara which when under the influence of the sattvaguna, helps to do good actions
- (2) The Taigasa (luminous) Ahamkara which when under the influence of the Ragas Guna, helps to do evil works ,
- (3) The Bhutadi (the first of elements) Ahamkara which when under the influence of the Tamas guna helps to do hidden works ,
- (4) The Sanumana (dependent on inference) Ahamkara is responsible for unintentional good ,
- (5) The Niranumana (not dependent on inference) Ahamkara is responsible for unintentional evil works

As these five modes of Ahamkara are the very essence of our acts, they are called Karmatmas It is also said that Ahamkar is

an act of Buddhi which enables us to apprehend the distinction between self and not self. Ahamkar, of course, means knowledge of self, but can there be any knowledge of the self without any knowledge of the not self? In being conscious of self we are also conscious of a not self or surrounding world in opposition to and in contrast with self. Because the self cannot be conscious of itself without being excited to conscious activity by something other than itself and there can be no activity without something to act upon. And again it follows from the Law of Relativity that self-consciousness is possible only in contrast with something other than self. Self-consciousness is always accompanied by other consciousness—perception of internal reality by perception of external. Self cognition and other cognition are inseparable correlatives contained in one and the same process of cognition. Hence it follows that “though Ahamkar means only the production of Ego, yet the production of Ego involves that of the Non-Ego, and thus divides the

whole world into what is subjective and objective "

CHAPTER VI

The Tanmatras

The Tanmatras are substances or essences which always remain the same and which are identical with themselves There are five Tanmatras—

- (a) The essence of Sound ,
- (b) The essence of Contact ,
- (c) The essence of Colour ,
- (d) The essence of Savour ,
- (e) The essence of Odour

These are the five essences and they emanate from Ahamkar An essence of a thing is that without which a thing would cease to be what it is The essence of sound is in sound only , that of colour in colour only that of odour in odour only and so on Sound and colour* and contact and savour and odour have specific differences in themselves—each of these has different

degrees of intensities, but the essence of each remains identically the same. A sound is sound whether it is acute or grave or voluminous, a touch is touch no matter whether it is hard or soft, rough or smooth, cold or hot, a colour is colour, no matter whether it is white or black, red or green, yellow or purple, a savour is savour, no matter whether it is pungent or bitter, astringent or corrosive, sweet or salt, an odour is odour, no matter whether it is sweet or offensive. The essence of sound is perceived in sound only, that of touch in touch only, that of colour in colour only, that of savour in savour only and that of odour in odour only.

CHAPTER VII

The Vikaras

There are sixteen vikaras or modifications of Prakṛti viz the eleven sense organs and the five elements. The eleven sense organs consist of five Buddhindriyas, five Kormendriyas and Manas.

Buddhindriyas.

Buddhindriyas are the perceptive organs, organs which convey to us the knowledge of the external world and each of these has its own peculiar object. The Buddhindriyas are five in number. They are

- (i) Srotra or ear and sound is its object.
- (ii) Tvaka, touch in skin and touch is its object.
- (iii) Chakrus, ear and colour is its object.
- (iv) Gihva, tongue and savour is its object.
- (v) Ghrana, nose and odour is its object.

Karmendriyas

Karmendriyas are the organs of action. The Buddhindriyas are the passive organs and the Karmendriyas are the active organs. They are also five in number viz.

- (i) The Voice which utters words.
- (ii) The Hand which performs work.
- (iii) The Feet which perform movement.
- (iv) Payu, the organ of excretion and evacuation.
- (v) Upastha, the organ of generation.

Hence Voice, Hand, Feet, Payu and Upastha are the active organs, for, uttering, working, moving, evacuating and generating are all actions and these are the organs which perform them

Manas.

Manas or mind is the central organ of perception—it is both cognitive and conative, it is both perceptive and active. It receives as well as acts. It is passive like the other organs of perception and it is active like the other organs of action. It is at once a Buddhindriya and a Karmendriya. In an orange the eye perceives its colour, the tongue its taste, the nose its smell and so on, thus each perceives its own appropriate object while Manas perceives all the objects at the same time in the same substance and hence it is a sense organ and when it acts according to the knowledge so attained it is an active organ.

Thus we see that there are altogether eleven organs in the Sankhya System but in Western Psychology mention is made of

thirteen organs as the following list of Titchener will show

1 Sensations of the special senses (external stimulus)

(1) Visual sensations

(a) Sensations of brightness (stimulus mixed light)

(b) Sensations of colour (stimulus homogeneous or pure light)

(2) Auditory sensations

(a) Sensation of noise (stimulus sound concussion or shock)

(b) Sensation of tone (stimulus sound wave)

(c) Olfactory sensations (stimulus odorous particles carried by a draught of air)

(4) Gustatory sensations

(Stimulus the chemical constitution of certain substances, which enables them to excite the organ of taste)

(5) Cutaneous sensations

(a) Sensation of pressure and pain

(stimulus : mechanical affection of cutis and epidermis).

(b) Sensations of temperature (stimulus thermal affection of the skin)

11. Organic sensations (internal stimulus)

(6) Muscular sensations (stimulus . contraction of muscle)

(7) Tendinous sensations (stimulus pull or strain upon tendon)

(8) Articular sensations (stimulus rubbing or jamming together of surfaces of joint)

(9) Sensations from the alimentary canal.

(a) From the pharynx (stimulus : dryness of mucous membrane)

(b) From the œsophagus (stimulus antiperistaltic reflex)

(c) From the stomach (stimulus dryness of gastric mucous membrane)

10 Circulatory sensations (stimulus change in circulation)

11. Respiratory sensations (stimulus change in breathing)

12. Sexual sensations (stimulus : change in blood supply, or in secretory activity, of the sex organs).

13. Sensation of the 'static sense' (stimulus : change in the distribution of pressure from the water of the semicircular canals of the internal ear).

Every sensation comes to us from a definite bodily organ.

CHAPTER VIII.

Mohabhutas

The Mohabhutas or the gross elements are five in number viz.—

- (a) Khiti, earth which is the support of water, light, air and ether.
- (b) Apa, water which moistens the other four viz earth, light, air and ether.
- (c) Teja, light which ripens earth, water, air and ether.
- (d) Marut, air which helps the other four viz. earth, water, light and ether by ripening.

(e) Byom, ether which gives space to water, earth, light and air

Thus we see that earth, air, water, light and ether are the five gross elements or Mohabhutas and each of these helps the rest by supporting, by drying, by moistening, by ripening and by giving space respectively

Earth has five qualities viz—it has sound, it has touch, it has colour, it has savour and it has odour, water has four viz sound, touch, colour and savour, light has three viz sound, touch and colour, air has two viz sound and touch and lastly ether has only one quality and that is sound

Earth Sound, touch, colour, savour, odour

Water .Sound touch, colour, savour

Light , Sound, touch, colour

Air...Sound, touch

Ether Sound



CHAPTER IX

Purusha.

What is Purusha ? It is neither evolute nor evolvent , it neither produces nor is produced Its important characteristics are as follows —

1. It has neither beginning, middle nor end

2 As it has no parts and as it is super-sensuous, it is subtle.

3 Endless is its existence and it pervades everything and hence it is omnipresent

4 It has feelings of pleasure and pain and it enjoys them for a while and hence it is perception

5 Qualities are of three kinds viz good, bad and indifferent but none of these qualities can be seen in the Purusha and hence it is Nirguna i e without qualities

6 It is not created and it cannot be created—it is self-existent and hence it is eternal

7. It is seer because it perceives the Vikara or modifications of Prakriti

8 It is not an agent because it is in-

different because it is without the *Gunās* or qualities

9 It knows the qualities of objective bodies and hence it is the knower of body

10 Neither good nor evil can affect it and hence it is spotless

11 It is neither evolute nor evolvent

We have given a rapid review of the twenty five substances of the Sankhya System which consist of eight Prakritis sixteen Vikaras and the Purusha

Table of the Principles

- | | | |
|-----|----------------------|-------------|
| (1) | Purusha | |
| | | |
| (2) | Prakriti (Avyakta) | |
| | | |
| (3) | Mahat or Buddhi | |
| | | |
| (4) | Ahankara | |
| | | 5 Tannatras |
| | (1) | Sabda |
| | (2) | Sparsa |
| | (3) | Rupa |
| | (4) | Rasa |
| | (5) | Ghandha |

11 Indriyas

5 Buddhindriyas + 5 Karmendriyas + Manas

- | | |
|-------------|-------------|
| (1) Srotra | (1) Vak |
| (2) Tvāka | (2) Panī |
| (3) Chakṣus | (3) Pada |
| (4) Gihvā | (4) Payu |
| (5) Ghraṇā | (5) Upastha |

5 Mohabhūtas

- (1) Akāśa (Sabda)
- (2) Vāyu (Sabda + Sparsa)
- (3) Tejas (Sabda + Sparsa + Rupa)
- (4) Ap (Sabda + Sparsa + Rupa + Rasa)
- (5) Pṛthivī (Sabda + Sparsa + Rupa + Rasa + Gandha)

Purusha cannot be an agent were it an agent then it would be the performer of good actions only. But how to account for the possibility of indifferent and bad actions? It is a fact that there are three kinds of action—good indifferent and bad and they must be accounted for. We cannot account for them by making purusha an agent for it is above all these. What are the three kinds of action?

CHAPTER X

Classification of action

- I Good conduct—kindness, control and restraint of the organs, freedom from hatred, reflection, displaying of super natural power
- II Indifferent conduct—Passion, anger, greed, fault finding, violence, discontent, rudeness
- III Bad conduct—Madness intoxication, lassitude, nihilism devotion to women, drowsiness sloth, worthlessness, and impurity

These are the three kinds of moral qualities mentioned in the Sankhya System. They never belong to Purusha apart from Prakriti, they belong to nature as seen by the Purusha.

The language of all nations supplies us with a long list of virtues and vices. The opposite of virtue or the want of it is vice. There are five Cardinal Virtues viz Justice, Benevolence, Truth Purity and Order, and all other virtues arise from the combination

of the Cardinal Virtues with various springs and conditions of human actions and of the antagonist Vices. It is often very difficult to draw a line of distinction between Virtue and Vice, it is often very difficult to say where virtue ends and vice begins.

CHAPTER VI

Monism or Pluralism

Now the question is Is Purusha one or many? According to the Sankhya System it is many and not one. If there were one Purusha then, if one were happy, all would be happy if one were unhappy, all would be unhappy, the pleasure of one would give pleasure to all, the pain of one would give pain to all, the trouble of one would bring trouble to all, the death of one would be the death of all, the confusion of one would confuse the rest and so on. Thus there is not one Purusha but many and this is evident from the variety in the acts of confusion health, birth, death, pleasure, pain &c

CHAPTER VII

Traigunya

There are three Gunas and they are Sattva, Rajas and Tamas and we must not take these Gunas in the sense of qualities, for, says Colebrook, "these three qualities are not mere accidents of nature, but are of its essence and enter into its composition like different rivers forming one stream, though for a time retaining their different colours" Max Muller holds that "constituent parts" might be a better rendering of the term Gunas

Vocabulary of the Gunas

- I Sattva Gunas are calmness, lightness, complacency, attainment of what is wished for, contentment, patience, joy, purity, veracity &c In short all that is bright comes under goodness or Sattva
- II Rajas Gunas are grief, distress, separation, excitement, attainment of what is evil, &c In short all that excites comes under Rajas or passion

- II. Tamas Gunas are ignorance, disgust, misery, heaviness, sloth, drowsiness, intoxication &c. In short all that is not bright, all that gives rise to pain comes under Tamas or darkness.
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CHAPTER XIII.

Sankara and Protisankar.

Now we are to examine the process of evolution or Sankara and the process of dissolution or Protisankar. The process of evolution is as follows: The Avyakta (undeveloped) Prokriti, when superintended by the high and omnipresent Purusha gives rise to Buddhi or intellect which is of eight kinds—four virtues and the corresponding vices. This Buddhi, the substance of intellect, gives rise to Ahamkar which is the conceit of 'I'; and this Ahamkar we have seen, is of three kinds—

- (a) Vaikarika Ahamkar, dominated by the Sattva Guna, helps to do good works.

(b) Taigasa Ahmkara, dominated by the Rajas guna helps to do evil works

(c) Bhutadi Ahamkar, dominated by the Tamas guna, helps to do hidden works

The Vaikarika (modified) Ahamkar gives rise, under the influence of Tamas, to the gross material elements to the gods and the senses. The Bhutadi Ahamkar gives rise to the Tanmatras, essences. The Tajas (luminous) Ahamkar gives rise to both Subtle and Gross elements. From the Tanmatras, essences, are produced the material elements—This is the process of evolution. And the process of dissolution is as follows. The material elements are dissolved into Tanmatras, essences, the essences and senses into Ahamkara, Ahamkar into Buddhi and Buddhi into Avyakta Prakriti. The Avyakta Prakriti is nowhere dissolved because it was never evolved, it is evolvent only.

CHAPTER XIV

Abhibuddhis and Karmajonis

By Abhibuddhis we understand apprehensions. They are five in number viz—

- (a) Vyavasaya ascertainment, consists in apprehending that a particular action is to be done
- (b) Abhimana, conceit, consists in knowing the distinction between self and not self
- (c) Iksha, desire, is a craving to perform an action
- (d) Kartavyata, is determination to act or will. It consists in the will of doing such acts as hearing, smelling, tasting &c
- (e) Kriya action, such as speaking, moving &c. It is the act of intellect pertaining to the Karmendriyas

All these five are the acts of intellect

There are five Karmajonis. They are—

- (1) Dhriti, energy consists in carrying out one's resolution when it has

been formed after due deliberation and reflection

- (2) Sradha, faithfulness, consists in study of the Veda, religious studentship, sacrificing and causing sacrifice to be performed, penance, giving and receiving proper gifts and making Homa-oblations
- (3) Sukha or bliss, knowledge sacrifices and penance and penitential acts are the means which give rise to bliss
- (4) Avividisha or carelessness
- (5) Vividisha or desire of knowledge.

CHAPTER XV

Sankhya Schopenhauer Hartmann

We have seen that there is certain analogy between the Sankhya System and that of Schopenhauer and Hartmann. Schopenhauer and Hartmann hold that nature acts unconsciously but rationally for the realisation of an end. 'But what is the end of nature ? The

end of nature is, according to them, to be conscious of itself. Does it aim then to universal consciousness? It cannot aim at universal consciousness for universal consciousness is a contradiction in term. How can consciousness be universal? Consciousness depends on plurality and change of state. There can be no consciousness where there is not a plurality of distinct objects and states which can be discriminated from each other. The more monotonously the same object is kept before the mind, the fainter does the consciousness of it becomes, till it reaches the vanishing point. Consciousness has as its important condition that it depends on the opposition of self and not self. The self can know itself only by contrast with a not self, the subject can be known only in relation to an object. A self can become conscious of itself only in so far as it is limited, as it is resisted and as it is acted on by a not-self, external to itself. Hence the possibility of consciousness demands that there must be an external

thing to resist it, to limit it and to act upon it. If this be the condition of consciousness there can be no universal consciousness and universal consciousness cannot be the end which nature strives to attain. Therefore it follows that nature strives to become conscious of itself only in finite minds.

We find the same process in the Sankhya System too. Here also Prakriti or nature works unconsciously but rises into unconscious reason and strives to attain self consciousness as its end. But nature itself, according to Sankhya, cannot attain to consciousness of its own but it does so by acting upon the souls which are as self-existent as nature itself. It seizes upon the souls, uses them as its slaves, so to say, and compels them to evolve mentality and consciousness in themselves, and in this way it attains its end. Thus Prakriti cannot attain its end in itself but it attains it through the instrumentality of the self-existent souls.

Thus we see that in the Sankhya System the souls are self-existent substances and

they are originally independent of nature, but nature seizes upon them and makes them produce consciousness in themselves. In Schopenhauer the consciousness of men is the consciousness of nature itself, whereas in Sankhya the consciousness which nature produces is not of nature itself—is not its own—but in souls which are self-existent

CHAPTER XVI

Doctrine of Causation

Now we are to deal with the doctrine of causality. All the above results are founded on the three grounds of evidence which are perception, inference and testimony which give rise to belief. But inference depends on cause and effect and the evolution of the world is a series of causes and effects. Hence Philosophy requires that we should have a clear conception of the exact significance of cause and effect. This discussion, of the true nature of cause and effect has given rise to two theories

1 The Sangata or Buddhist School.

The most important problem of Philosophy is to find out the primordial principle of the universe, is to determine the origin and cause of this universe. Every system of Philosophy is an attempt to answer the question. The Sangatas or the Buddhists hold that non-existent things are the causes of existent things, that existent things come out from the non-existent and sink back again into non-existence. They come from nothing and go back to nothing. But this view, on the very face of it, is absurd and opposed to Science and hence we can reject it at once.

The authorship of this theory cannot be assigned to all the Buddhists, Sankhya must have referred to the Madhyamika Buddhists for, it is they who hold that things rise out of a universal void and sink back again into it. The other Buddhists established the reality of substance and held that causation is the ground of reasoning.

2 The Nyaya School.

The Nyayikas hold that what is at first

non-existent comes out of the existent and becomes existent This too is an impossible theory. Can there be any cause which can produce a thing which had no existence at all? Is there any cause which can bring into existence what had no previous existence? Can there be any new creation? Can you make red green or horse house, or man cow? To bring one existence into its contrary existence is to raise a thing from non existence to existence which is absurd But does not this pen with which I write now exist which did not exist before? The answer is The quality of the pen had existence before this particular pen and therefore some reality existed corresponding to it

Our conclusion, then, is that what we call an effect had existence before the operation of its cause began The cause does not really produce the thing but makes it manifest Thus pressure makes manifest the oil contained in the sesame seed and the milk in the cow's udder A thing previously non-existent cannot be produced

What is the relation between cause and effect ? The cause must either be previously connected with the effect or it must not be so connected. If the cause be connected with the effect then the effect must have existed along with the cause because connection is possible only between existent things. Can there be a connection between two things if either of them be non-existent ? Then again, if the cause be not connected with the effect, then how are we to know what particular effect would follow from what particular cause ? Now, connection between them is impossible only when effect is not-existent and if the effect be not-existent then any effect may arise from any cause, for there is no affinity between cause and effect and as a matter of fact no affinity can exist between them, and when there is no affinity there can be nothing to determine what particular effect will be produced by what particular cause.

But can we not say that the cause may have the capacity of producing the effect

without being itself previously connected with its own effect. Connection there may not be between it and its cause but capacity it may have to produce its effect and the fact that it produces convinces us of the fact that it has the capacity to produce. Sankhya would meet this argument by saying that we know that a thing has the capacity to produce an effect only when it is producing it. We cannot know that a thing has any capacity to produce unless and until it produces. The capacity and the effect are correlative and they must exist together.

The cause and effect are correlative they must exist together—one cannot exist apart from the other. The cloth cannot exist apart from the threads which it is composed of. Because the cloth is an accomplished fact therefore we should not think that it is something which is quite different from its cause, the threads. But can it not be said here that the threads themselves do the work of clothing? No. Do they manifest the nature of cloth until and unless arranged

in a particular way ? So long they are not so arranged they cannot do the work of clothing. It must not be understood that causation consists in the production of a previously non-existent thing but it consists in the bringing forth and revealing of what was previously concealed as the limbs of a tortoise are concealed when inside the cell, but revealed when they are unfolded and thrust out

CHAPTER XVII

Evolution and Devolution

From the above it is evident that creation is an impossible assumption of Philosophy. There is no such thing as creation which means the production of altogether new things. It is not creation but evolution which is the law of nature. Creation is myth and evolution is fact. Creation means bringing into existence what does not exist whereas evolution means an unfolding of

what was previously folded up. It makes explicit what is implicit.

As there is no creation there is no destruction for destruction implies creation. What exists is not destruction or an annihilation but devolution or involution. What is non-existent can never rise into existence, nor the existent can sink back into non-existence. Hence creation is as impossible as destruction. Nothing is being created and nothing is being destroyed but everything is either being evolved or devolved, for evolution and devolution are the laws of nature. Evolution is as much important to devolution as devolution is to evolution. One cannot go on without the other.

We conclude, then, that effects are identical with causes and this identity of cause and effect enables us to know the existence of the great evolvent Nature, (Prokṛti). The manifestations of Prokṛti which are the samething as the effects of Prokṛti help us to know the existence of Prokṛti because the effects are identical with the cause.

CHAPTER XVIII

Spencer

Spencer also holds the same view with Sankhya. What Sankhya calls Prokṛti Spencer calls the *unknowable*. As we know the existence of Prokṛti through its manifestations so we also know the existence of the *unknowable* through its manifestations. We know this much about it, that it is an inexhaustible force which reveals itself to us in the world of phenomena. But how is it that Spencer calls it unknowable while he himself admits that this whole world is but the revelation of its own self? All that he means is simply this. What we know is only its revelations and we know that it reveals of itself to us. We cannot go beyond this, we cannot go beyond its revelations. The whole world is its revelation and we cannot transcend this revelation. We know nothing of it except the fact that it reveals of itself in the world. But the question is. How is it, that we cannot

transcend the revelations ? It is here that Spencer is open to criticism. Spencer reduces Prokriti's revelation to nothing but sensations ; he holds that it is an inexhaustible power of producing sensations in us, and what we know is sensation and we cannot go beyond our sensation.

CHAPTER XIX.

Evolution by Preformation.

This doctrine of Sankhya that there is no creation, but only evolution foreshadows the modern theory of *Evolution by preformation* as opposed to evolution by Epigenesis. Preformation means an unfolding of what already exists as preformed in the germ cells. The crude form of this theory supposed that a thing with all its parts and functions is present in the germ but only in an exceedingly minute form. The tree, for instance, is in its seed. Indeed some went so far as to say that there was a first parent germ of

every species and within this one parent germ contained folded up one within the other, all the individuals of the species, and all the individuals of every species have sprung from one parent germ, just like an endless series of box each contained within the other. Remove one box you will find another, remove that you will find another and so on. Similarly each new generation is the opening up of a germ box.

Modern Biology, however, does not hold that all the parts and all the functions of a thing are contained in its germ, nor does it hold that all the individuals of every species were contained folded up, one within the other in the first parent germ but holds that the germ contains all the necessary materials and it also contains the forces and the tendencies, the working of which ultimately builds up the organism into its final form. This is evidently the meaning of the Sankhya System.

CHAPTER XX

Epigenesis

Epigenesis is the theory that organic bodies and parts are produced by superadded vital activity and not merely developed from pre-existing bodies. It means that the various parts of the organism are not drawn out from within but are added on from without. This theory assumes that the external forces are always acting on the germinal organism from without and moulding it into its proper shape—shape properly adapted to its external circumstances. Spencer also in this way, explains in his *Biology*, the development of organism and in his *Psychology*, the development of mind. Both mind and body are constantly being acted on and influenced by the surrounding environment. Every change in the environment produces a corresponding change in the organism. The essence of mental life and of bodily life is one, —is the adjustment of inner to outer relations. Minds and

bodies inhabit environments which act on them and which they in turn react upon

Thus we see that Spencer accepts the theory of Epigenesis or moulding from without though he is known as the apostle of the theory of Evolution Sankhya also, we see, trusts in the theory of Epigenesis when it explains the origin of conscious mind The soul does not evolve its own consciousness Consciousness is not drawn out of the soul It is *Prakṛti*, the external forces of nature which imposes, so to say, consciousness upon it

CHAPTER XXI

Aristotle's *Entelechy*

Sankhya theory of evolution reminds us of Aristotle's *entelechy* Aristotle holds that everything has its end form or idea immanent in it, & *is* an impulse towards that which it should be Thus the tree is latent in the germ, as unrealised form or idea which strives to realise itself, and in so doing

evolves the germ into a tree. The end or idea considered as force, working within the mind and evolving it into its ultimate and proper form, is called the *entelechy* (en=in, Telos=end, echo=I have). It is the end or final form which the thing has within itself, e. g. the perfect tree is *entelechy* of the seed; soul is *entelechy* of the body, evolving it into a more and more perfect form; God is the *entelechy* of the world.

CHAPTER XXII.

Vedantism.

The Vedantins hold that Brahman is the only real thing and all other things are mere illusions and have no real existence of their own. The world of nature is an illusory emanation from the one existent Brahman and has no real existence of its own. But is it not our natural belief that this world is real, is substantial? What evidence there is to contradict this our natural belief? (see

Reid's natural belief) Quite possible it is that we may mistake a rope for a snake but can it ever happen that we may mistake this real tangible world for a dream, for an illusion ?

Cause and effect must have some relation and must be of the same nature as we have seen before Mill however does not accept the theory that cause and effect must have some connection and they must be of the same nature and it is strange that he should class this belief which is accepted by all and which is in perfect harmony with the modern law of conservation, among the list of fallacies Now if cause and effect be of the same nature as they are, then Brahman and his effects argue the Sankhyas must also be of the same nature What is the nature of Brahman and his effect, the world ? One is intelligent and the other is not, one occupies space and the other does not, one offers resistance and the other does not, hence nothing can be of more opposite nature than the intelligent Brahman and the

CHAPTER XXIV.

Teleology

. But the theists will still urge that there may be abundant evidence of intelligence in nature where there is not evidence of perfect intelligence, that we are plainly very incompetent critics of a system so vast as the universe and that all nature is one great whole, and each thing in it has a multitude of uses and relations, with reference to all of which it must be viewed in order that a complete and definite judgment regarding it may be formed. Is the purpose of any vast machine either disproved or likely to be unravelled, if we confine our attention simply to such parts which seem to us to be unnecessary or inexplicable? What are the signs of intelligence? They are selection, combination and gradation. Do we not find evidences of selection in nature in the limbs of the animals, in the organs of sense and in their adaptations to elements? Do we not find stronger marks of intelligence in the co-ordination of parts

to whole, as in organism, in the co-ordination of the organism as a whole to the external world, and in the co-ordination of the different organisms to each other? Is not adaptation of means to ends an evidence of intelligence and do we not see in nature that when an end is attained, it becomes a means for another and that being attained, for another and so on up to some ultimate end? Is it not a fact that matter gives rise to vegetable life? Air, earth, water, being acted on by heat and light, build up the organism of plant. Does not vegetable life give rise to animal life? The plants furnish the animals with materials for nourishment. Does not animal life give rise to human life? Plants and animals are the means of support of human life.

Now all these facts go to show that throughout nature force is every where guided and directed by intelligent purpose. Where order meets us we naturally, and immediately infer that there is the work of intelligence, and order meets us everywhere in

striking fashion, give a direct contradiction to the teleological idea of the purposive arrangement of the living protoplasm " "All the higher animals, and plants in general, all organisms which are not entirely simple in structure, but are made up of a number of organs in orderly co-operation—are found on close examination" says the professor, "to possess a number of useless or inoperative members, sometimes indeed hurtful and dangerous " "In our own human organism," continues the professor, "we have similar useless rudimentary structures in the muscles of the ear, in the eyelid, in the nipple and milk gland of the male, and in other parts of the body , indeed, the vermiform appendix of our caecum is not only useless, but extremely dangerous, and inflammation of it is responsible for a number of deaths every year ' There are such defects in the constitution and course of nature that it is impossible for us to believe that it is the work of a principle, absolutely wise and absolutely self complete such as the

Vedantins hold Brahman to be From an absolutely wise and holy God will come only what is absolutely intelligent and good Some however even go so far as to assert that there is no evidence of intelligence or design in this world The wings of the ostrich, the feet of the sloth, the horns of the deer are so imperfectly developed as to be incapable of performing any serviceable functions Does not our animal appetite spring out of a want? Is not the very construction of every sense and every faculty of every animal a source of pain? Are not there hosts of animals whose very nature compels them to live by rending and devouring other animals? Can a large animal move a little without crushing and killing and destroying numbers of minute and sentient creatures? Are all these the evidence of an absolutely intelligent principle? Are not these the evidences of imperfect adaptations in nature, of want of intelligent design, such as could not have come from God?

CHAPTER XXIV.

Teleology.

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Now all these facts go to show that throughout nature force is every where guided and directed by intelligent purpose. Where order meets us we naturally, and immediately infer that there is the work of intelligence and order meets us everywhere in

the universe. Hence the conclusion is that the products which we see in the world involves the exercise of intelligence *viz.* adaptations of means to ends, of things to the needs of the soul. But the Sankhyas hold, as we have seen, that the effect must be contained in the cause. But we see that there are marks of intelligence in the effect and hence such intelligent effects cannot be explained in any other way than by supposing intelligent design in the cause of nature. Therefore there must have been at work an intelligent cause—an all-seeing Supreme Lord.

CHAPTER XXV.

Atheistic Answer

Sankhya however meets this argument of the Vedantins by asserting that unintelligent things produce effects beneficial to the soul without any intelligent adaptation. Does not unintelligent *milk* produce beneficial effects in the calf? Does not unin-

telligent rain give rise to the good of living creatures ? In the same way nature acts unintelligently yet acts for the good of the soul

Sankhya, however, does not rest satisfied with this assertion simply but proceeds still further and asks If there is a God, as the theists proclaim there is, why did he create the world ? If God has remained from all eternity without the world, how did the need of a world arise ? Was there any defect in his being without the world ? If so why did he not feel the defect before ? And does not defect imply imperfection ? The theists assume that God created the world not from the feeling of want but from the feeling of compassion and love

Now if God created the world from the impulse of love or compassion then he must have felt this love either *before* or *after* the work of creation Did he feel the feeling of compassion before creation ? Compassion or love implies that there must be an object of love or compassion There can be no love

without an object to love ; there can be no compassion without an object which excites it. If you say God felt compassion before creation then certainly it arose in the presence of nothing—it arose even when there was nothing to excite it. But how can there be an impulse to relieve from pain beings—beings which did not even exist ? Such feelings were an effect without cause.

But if you say he did not feel compassion until the world had been created you commit the fallacy of arguing in circle. God created the world from the motive of compassion and he felt it for his own work after he had created it. Desire of relieving misery of beings prompted God to create the world and its creation made miserable beings !

What is then our conclusion ? Our conclusion, therefore, is that the development of unintelligent nature proceeds spontaneously of itself. There is no designing intelligence to guide it. Soul and nature are self-existent things and they produce the world when they come together.

The moving impulse for the development and preservation of mind is blind and unintentional. The impulse to the development of mentality does not proceed from the soul itself. Soul only provides the occasion or opportunity for and it is not the cause of development. As iron moves when in proximity with the magnet which is unmoved so also nature moves and works in proximity to the soul. This reminds us of the unmoved theory of the world of Aristotle.

CHAPTER XXVI

Unmoved Theory

Motion in one thing is caused by motion in another thing and that in another and so on. But in rising from lower to higher sources of motion we must come at last to a first beginning or absolute source of motion and change—we must come to a thing which moves all things without being itself moved. What is that thing which moves all things but is not moved? Plato

calls it 'Idea' and Aristotle 'form'. This form or highest good or say what you like, does not of itself put forth any force. It is merely the goal towards which all things naturally tend. The force or energy is, according to Aristotle, inherent in substance itself, and the absolute form moves all things without itself being moved, without being itself in any way affected. It is not energy but it guides energy. As matter tends to fill up a vacuum so all things tend towards the perfect form and this tension towards perfection gives rise to evolution. Owing to this tension matter evolves itself into all the imperfect provisional forms which constitute the world of space and time. Thus soul and nature though originally and essentially independent—self-existent as they are—each comes to be dependent to a certain extent upon the other. Nature seeks to enter into conscious experience and it can be conscious only in soul and hence it strives to absorb soul and to develop it and thereby to become conscious of itself. Thus we see that the

Sankhya System implies that nature acts and acts with purpose but unconsciously.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Final Liberation

Soul is thus being acted on and influenced by Prokriti or Nature. Its sensation and intellect and feeling are imposed upon it by its subjectivity to nature, Prokriti. But when soul comes to understand that it is being influenced by Prokriti, that it is under the yoke of Nature, that sensation, intellect, pain are not essential to it, and that they are imposed on it from without what though it does not desire them, then it makes an attempt to escape from this subjection, to shake off these imposed superfluities, to throw off the yoke of bondage and to come back to its original state of independence out of all connection with nature.

Thus we see that final liberation, final bliss depends on knowledge—knowledge regarding the true nature of soul, knowledge

which makes it aware of the fact that sensation, pleasure and pain are not its essential and natural state but can be thrown off. Suppose there are two men—one blind and another lame and they accidentally come together and one becomes the help of the other. The lame man mounts up on the back of the blind man. The blind man helps the lame man by supplying him motion and the lame man helps the blind man by giving him guidance. Thus the want of the one is supplied by the other and vice versa. Same is the relation with Prokriti and soul, Prokriti has the moving force but it wants the light of consciousness, soul has the susceptibility of being raised into consciousness but wants the moving force. Thus soul as it has no moving force is like a lame manⁿ and it is capable of supplying the light of consciousness ; and Prokriti is like the blind man as it has the power of motion though lacking in consciousness. Hence Prokriti is able to seize upon the soul and make it slave to itself to do its work for it, to make it supply the

light which it wants. But when the soul attains further understanding it begins to use nature for its own purpose, instead of being used as slave by nature it begins to use it to serve its own purpose. At first it uses nature as instruments of its pleasure and satisfaction. But more it uses nature for the purpose of pleasure and joy, more it finds that it becomes dependent on nature, that it becomes a slave of nature and that it loses its independence. It seeks to attain pleasure but more it seeks more painful it becomes and it comes to know that pleasure involves a greater amount of pain. Then it seeks to devise means by which it can succeed in casting off the badge of bondage, in shaking off its subjection to nature and in becoming free and independent again—just like the lame man when he has made the blind man carry him to his destination dismounts, and sends him off wandering again by himself.

Thus it is the union of nature and soul which gives rise to experience which makes nature to be conscious of itself and from

which the soul derives its own satisfaction. But a time comes when the soul finds that this satisfaction is temporary, is fleeting, is unreal and is pregnant with misery. It then comes to its sense and tries to break off the chain of slavery.

But a question may be raised here : How is it that nature gets hold of the soul ; exhibits itself in the soul ; makes it yield consciousness and lets it go to its former stage, lets it return to unconsciousness ? The answer is that nature after once exhibiting itself in the soul becomes satisfied and seeks nothing more. As a husband when he has once satisfied himself about the faults of his wife seeks to shun her company in the future or as an actress having made herself once appear in the stage withdraws herself satisfied, so nature also, having once exhibited herself in the conscious soul is satisfied to fall back into unconsciousness again and let the soul escape.

Such is the teaching of Kapila—the author of the Sankhya System.

CHAPTER XXVIII

Virtue

According to the Sankhya System knowledge is the only virtue and liberation from pain : e attainment of perfect bliss is the only end of human life and this end can be attained by arresting the course of transmigration and this course can be arrested only by knowledge As to the nature of virtue the principal theories of classical antiquity may be noticed here to bring light on the subject under review

Plato

Reason is according to Plato the supreme and governing power in man Passions are of two kinds—Irascible and Concupiscible Irascible passions spring from a love of honour and superiority and the Concupiscible passions arise from a love of ease and pleasure The soul is in a state of degradation and exile when in connection with and partly in subjection to the body And the great aim of Philosophy is to check the lower principles of our nature, to govern

them, to give free scope and development to Reason, to prepare the soul for that higher state to which it will return and thereby to free it from the incumbrances of the body. This is also the aim of the Sankhya System.

* Aristotle and the Peripatetics.

Virtue consists in pursuing a middle course—a course which is equally remote from either extreme. Thus Fortitude is the medium between Rashness and Cowardice, and Temperance is the intermediate course between Austerity and Indulgence. Plato frequently referred to the soul as having existed before its life in the body, and as destined to live after the death of the body. Aristotle confined his views to the present state only.

CHAPTER XXIX.

SOUL.

Generally the term soul is applied to the inner or spiritual principle of man. Aristotle holds that soul is that by which we feel, live,

will, move and understand Modern German philosophers make a distinction between soul and spirit Soul is, according to them, that which manifests itself in the phenomena of dreaming and is connected with the cerebral action It is the inferior part of our nature Spirit is that part of our nature which tends to the purely rational, the lofty and the divine This distinction between soul and spirit can be noticed in the Christian scriptures where the apostle Paul speaks of the Word of God as dividing asunder the soul and spirit—the former being regarded as the sentient or animal principle and the latter the rational principle in man This distinction is also common among the ancient Greek philosophers, they regard soul as the principle of life and spirit as the principle of intelligence In Sankhya philosophy Soul is self-existent, it is neither evolute nor evolvent, it has no moving force, but it is capable of being raised into consciousness Nature seeks to enter into consciousness and it is only in soul that it can become conscious

Nature seizes upon the soul and makes it conscious. But the soul when it attains fuller understanding begins to see that it can use nature for its own purpose and at first uses nature for purposes of pleasure and satisfaction but when it finds that this use of nature means in the end slavery to nature, it seeks to find a means of casting off its subjection to nature and becomes free again. Thus in Sankhya Philosophy too there are two kinds of soul, so to say—one false when it is acted on and influenced by Prokriti—the other true or real soul when it is free from the influence of Prokriti.

When Sankhya Philosophy holds that salvation can be attained by arresting the course of transmigration of souls it admits that soul is immortal. It holds that soul is self-existent and eternal and as such it can neither be destroyed nor created. It does not consist of material parts ; it does not consist of any modification of matter ; it is not inseparably connected with any combination of material elements.

Hence we have every reason to believe that soul can survive the existence of the physical parts of our frame. Soul is immaterial—it is indivisible and it is free from fears excited by the dissolution of the body. All the changes which matter undergoes arise because it is compound, because it is divisible. But soul has no parts. It is by its very nature indissoluble. No external force can destroy it nor it has an inherent tendency to destruction.

The soul secure in her existence smiles
At the drawn dagger, and defies its point

THE NYAYA SYSTEM.

CHAPTER I.

Its Scope

What is the whole and sole end of human action, of human life? It is salvation—the attainment of blessedness. But what is the true means of salvation, of attaining perfect bliss? The Nyaya System is based on the principle that knowledge of truth is the sole means of securing the attainment of the *sumnum bonum* or *Apavarga*. This life is full of troubles and anxieties, miseries and pains which we are always trying to annihilate but annihilate we cannot until and unless we have attained perfection and perfection we cannot attain without doing the good but to do the good is to know the good. Knowing the good leads to doing what is good and doing the good leads to the destruction of pain and destruction of

pain is the ultimate end and good, the supreme blessedness.

The Nyaya system, therefore begins with the statement of the art of attaining truth—of the principles of Logic and then proceeds to ascertain, as warranted by logical inference, the nature of the world, soul and God and to determine the destinies of soul, for, before we can really know the true nature of things we must, first of all, know how or by what means we know it And this is what Kant also maintains when he says that Philosophy must weigh before it affirms, must enquire into the conditions of knowledge before it assumes to know Philosophy must be based on *Critique* or Theory of knowledge as opposed to dogmatism Thus we see that the Nyaya thinkers worked in the same spirit as the modern western philosophers since the time of Kant

Now what is proof? Proof consists in arriving at the right knowledge by the right regulation of the knowing principle—the self or soul which knows—and by the right

regulation of the instruments of knowledge—eye, ear, taste, smell etc.

Logic is a regulative science—it teaches us how to regulate our power of observation and reasoning—it is the art of knowledge. But we must bear in mind that all knowledge comes ultimately from God and hence logic is nothing more than an art of interpreting what God has revealed to us in the *Vedas*. Thus we see that the Nyayaikas were the Schoolmen of India, for the Schoolmen held that in their Philosophy they were using the Logic of Aristotle simply to interpret the teachings contained in the scriptures.

There are sixteen *Podarthas* or topics with which Nyaya System begins. They are—

1. *Promana*, means of knowledge.
2. *Promeaya*, objects of knowledge.
3. *Samasya*, doubt.
4. *Prayojana*, purpose.
5. *Drishtanta*, instance.
6. *Siddhanta*, established truth.
7. *Avayava* premisses.
8. *Tarka*, reasoning.

9. *Nirnaya*, conclusion
- 10 *Vada*, argumentation
- 11 *Falpa*, Sophistry
- 12 *Vitanda*, wrangling, cavilling
- 13 *Hetvabhāsa*, fallacies
- 14 *Chhala*, quibbles
- 15 *Jati*, false analogies
- 16 *Nigrahasthan*, unfitness for arguing

CHAPTER II

Means of Knowledge

Pramana

The Sources of knowledge are four viz—

- (a) Sensuous perception, or *Pratyaksha*
- (b) Inference, or *Anumana*
- (c) Analogy, or *Upamana*
- (d) Testimony, or *Sabda*

These four are the means or measures of knowledge. We should now examine each of these. But as we are dealing with the means and measures of knowledge we must first of all know what is

Knowledge

Knowledge consists in the possession of

true ideas of things and relations of things together with the belief that the ideas are true. Thus knowledge supposes *ideas* of things, or relations of things and of attributes ; it supposes the truth of these ideas and it supposes the consciousness of their truth *i.e.* belief. Thus idea, truth and belief are the constituents of knowledge, and Logic aims at the knowledge of truth. But what is

Truth.

Thought is an intellectual activity—it is a process only—it is after all only a means to an end and that end is the attainment of truth. The end of Logic is to aid and guide thought in the attainment of the knowledge of truth.

By truth we mean correspondence of our ideas or representations which we construct in our minds of things and events of the world with the things and events themselves as they actually exist in the external world independent of our ideas or representations. Hence it is evident that the truth supposes that

there must be a conscious principle or mind which is capable of knowing, it supposes that there must be a world of things and events existing in the external world independently of our mind and capable of being known and represented in terms of consciousness, and it also supposes modes or forms of consciousness which are capable of representing the things and relations of the external world

A distinction however has been drawn by the European philosophers between Empirical Truth and Metaphysical Truth. Empirical Truth is correspondence of our ideas with actual and possible sensations, but sensations are only states of our mind and consequently they can give us no knowledge of things as they exist apart from and independent of our sensation. Hence Metaphysical truth is correspondence of our ideas with things as they are in themselves apart from our sensations

But is metaphysical truth attainable? If so, how far? and in what sense? and by

what means?—this is one of the most debated questions of Philosophy and Logic.

Now let us examine the sources of knowledge. We have seen that Perception Inference, Analogy and Testimony are the sources of knowledge.

Perception, or *Prottyaksa*.

Perception is knowledge produced by direct contact between a sense-organ and its corresponding object. Perception gives us presentations of objects in space.

But is perception a simple process? The knowledge of a tree or a house which I derive by my sight seems at first sight as direct and as uncomplicated a process as any that we are aware of in our minds. Even Locke who was one of the first to begin to analyse it held it to be the first and simplest idea we have.

As a matter of fact perception is an extremely complex operation. True it is that it is one of the earliest mental operation in the infant but adult perception is a great deal more developed than that of the baby.

Careful introspection will show that perception includes the following stages—

- (a) Sensation—passive affection of the self occasioned by the object observed
- (b) Discrimination of the present sensation from other sensations, generic and specific
- (c) Assimilation of the present sensation to other similar sensations
- (d) Objectification of the sensation
- and (e) Localisation of the sensation

Thus we see that perception is not a purely receptive operation and that in perception the thinking principle is not purely passive. It is a complex process involving both presentative and representative elements. The Nyayaikas do not enter into the question of the process of perception but holds that it is direct and intuitive.

Protyaksa is of six kinds—five arising from five sense-organs and one arising from *manasa*. The perception arising from the five sense-organs we may call external per-

ception as it gives us the knowledge of the external world ; and perception arising from the internal organ or mind may be called internal perception as it gives us the knowledge of the mental world.

These perceptions are cognitive—they give us knowledge of the qualities of their proper objects Taste, Smell, Touch, Sight and Ear and Mind are the senses and Savour, Odour, Touch, Colour, Sound and Mind are the respective objects of these senses Thus—

- (a) Auditory perception gives us the knowledge of *Sabda* or Sound ;
- (b) Tactual perception gives us the knowledge of *Sparsa* or touch ,
- (c) Visual Perception gives us the knowledge of *Rupa* or colour ,
- (d) Gustatory perception gives us the knowledge of *Rasa* or Savour ;
- (e) Olfactory perception gives us the knowledge of *Gandha* or odour.
- (f) Introspection gives us the knowledge of mind.

Now it will be seen that perception gives us knowledge only of singular facts. It gives us knowledge of the existence of something which is in direct contact with our organs and which have the attribute or power of producing sensations in us. Thus when I hear a sound, I perceive that something *exists*, it is distinct from myself and it has the attribute of sounding, and then I say 'that is something sounding', but if I recognise what that something is, I say, 'that is the sound of the college bell' "

Again it will be seen that perception is limited to present experiences, it gives us knowledge of what is present to us, of what directly affects us through our senses. It can give us no knowledge of distant past and future and hence it fails to establish universal proposition. It can tell us that this crow is black, that crow is black and the other crow is black but it cannot tell us that All crows are black and hence the necessity of

Inference or Anumana.

While perception gives us knowledge of singular facts and is limited to present experience, Inference gives us the knowledge of general truths and thereby helps us to think of distant, past and future. Perception supplies the materials for inference and hence perception comes first.¹ Perception gives us knowledge of particular facts and from these particular facts as data we pass, by means of inference, to facts as yet unobserved.

Inference or Anumana is of three kinds :—

1. Purvabat Anumana.
2. Seshabat Anumana.
3. Samanyato Drishta Anumana.

Purvabata Anumana proceeds from what was before *i.e.* it proceeds from an antecedent. When the antecedent is known the consequent can be inferred for, the antecedent is the sign of the consequent with which it is universally associated. This unconditional association is what is known as Vyapti—its literal meaning is "pervasion of one thing by another." When

the cause is known we infer the effect. It is an inference from the sign to what is signified, thus seeing the cloud, (Purba or Prius) we infer that it will rain. Such inference from cause to effect is known as Purvabat Anumana.

Seshabat Anumana—It is an inference from the effect to cause. Seeing the effect we can infer the cause of the effect. Seeing the smoke we infer the existence of fire—here smoke is the effect and fire the cause.

Samanyota Drishti Anumana—This is an inference from one thing to another when they are constantly seen together. If it so happens that whenever there is A there is B, we can infer the existence of A from the existence of B or we can infer the existence of B from the existence of A. Thus we can infer the tail of a beast by seeing its horn. It is a beast because it has tail and it has horn because it is a beast. Peacocks are screaming and therefore it will rain, for, we have seen that whenever peacocks scream it rains.

Comparison or Upamana

Besides perception and inference there is another source of knowledge known as Upamana. It consists in the recognition of likeness—it consists in classing a thing with like thing previously known. Suppose I have been told that Gavaya is like a cow, If it so happens that I see an animal which resembles a cow but not a cow, I then infer that it is a Gavaya.

Testimony or Sabda

Sabda may mean two things—it may mean the percept of one worthy to be trusted or it may mean a right percept. It may refer either to visible or invisible objects. Who are worthy to be trusted? Rishis and Aryas and even Mlechhas (barbarians) are worthy to be trusted provided they be well informed.

CHAPTER III

OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE

Prameya.

We have seen that Perception, Inference, Analogy and Testimony are the sources of

knowledge, but knowledge implies an object which is known. Hence the question arises what is the object of knowledge ? There are twelve objects of knowledge viz , Atman, Sarira, Indriya, Artha, Buddhi, Manas, Probritti, Dosha, Pretyabhaba, Phal, Duksha and Apabarga. We should now proceed to examine each of these objects of knowledge.

Self or Soul (Atman)

Desire, hatred, will knowing, pleasure and pain are the characteristics of Atman or Soul. No mention is made of Paramatman in the Nyaya System.

The question arises. How can self be an object of knowledge ? Do we not attain knowledge and perform action through our Jnanendriyas and Karmendriyas , do we not enjoy pleasure and endure pain through our body , do we not judge and deliberate by our Buddhi ? If so, wherein lies the necessity of soul ? Are we to understand by soul that it is body indriya and buddhi ? Or is it something beyond and above these things ?

True it is that our sense organs give rise

to our knowing; that our active organs to our willing and our body to our feeling, but feeling, willing and knowing these are the states of mind—they constitute the stream of consciousness—they are called mental phenomena. We cannot think of states and activities without thinking at the same time of something of which they are the states and activities; we cannot think of feeling, thinking and willing without thinking of something which feels thinks and wills and that something is what we call soul.

Now what is the nature of this self? An analysis of consciousness will reveal to us regarding the nature of self that

- (1) The self is the agent or subject of its states and processes. There is no awareness of its changing states without awareness of the self or subject of which they are the states.
- (2) That the self is permanent. It is a single permanent principle; it manifests itself to itself in a

connected system of states and activities, it remains one and the same identical principle through all successive states, and it connects to gether all the successive states into the unity of a single mental life

It may be said that this continuity of consciousness may be suspended by the interruptions or time gaps or by the abrupt breaks in the content of the thought. But it must be remembered that time gaps cannot break the continuity of consciousness, for the self always remains identical with itself. The self before the sleep and the self after the sleep are identical—time gap can not break the continuity of self in twain. The present thought of a person after sleep although not ignorant of the time gap, regards itself as continuous with the past thought of himself. His present consciousness and his past are, so to say parts of the same self. Again, the change of consciousness from one state to another is never absolutely abrupt. Does not

a voluminous thunder crashing rend in twain the continuity of consciousness upon which it abruptly breaks ? The answer must be in the negative Is not the feeling of the thunder is also the feeling of silence as just gone Do we hear the thunder, pure and simple, or the thunder-breaking upon silence and-contrasting with it ?

Sarira or Body

The second object of knowledge is Sarira or body Body is the seat of action, of the senses and of the objects of the senses Can we identify body with Atman ? Goutoma says we cannot, for then with the annihilation of body there will be an annihilation of the consequences of good and evil deeds—the consequences of good and evil deeds would cease to follow the self through an endless series of births and rebirths

As every mental process has as its condition a bodily process—a change in the central nervous system and, more particularly in the central cortex, knowledge must have body as one of its object Mind and

body are independent things, each capable of influencing and of being influenced by the other. We cry because we are grieved, we fail to think clearly because we have taken too heavy a dinner, we feel pain because we have got wounds.

Sense organs or Indriyas

The third object of knowledge is the Sense-organs or Indriyas. Indriyas are those sense organs which are specially adapted to receive stimuli from the external world and thereby to perceive the qualities of the external world. The study of the self necessitates the study of the body but to study body it is necessary that we should study the sense organs of which it is composed.

There are five sense organs viz eye, ear, taste, touch, smell. These organs are different from the Atman. Through the ear we perceive sound, through the eye, colour, through the nose, smell, through the touch warmth, and through the tongue, taste. Thus it is clear that each organ perceives

its own object But Atman perceives all these objects, all these impressions, *vis* taste, colour *etc* at the same time and in the same object As each of these senses has its own object peculiar to itself and while it is possible for the Atman to perceive all the objects of all the senses at the same time and in the same object, it is evident that Atman is different from the Indriyas

Objects of the Senses or Artha

Artha is the fourth object of knowledge By Artha we mean the meanings and objects of the senses We have seen that each sense has its object The senses draw their origin and their perceptions from their elements from which they are supposed to arise These elements are earth, water, light, air and ether Earth is the element from which our nose perceives its object, odour, water is the element from which our taste perceives its object, savour, light is the element from which our vision draws its object, colour, air is the element from which our skin perceives its object, touch, and ether is the element

from which our ear perceives its object, sound. Thus odour, savour, colour, touch and sound are the objects of our senses.

There are five kinds of sensation : Visual sensation giving us the knowledge of colour which comes from light, auditory sensations giving us the knowledge of sound which has its source in ether, olfactory sensations giving us the knowledge of odour which has its origin in earth, gustatory sensations giving us the knowledge of savour which comes from water; and cutaneous sensations giving us the knowledge of touch which is derived from air. No mention is made of organic sensations.

Buddhi or Understanding

The fifth object is knowledge, *Buddhi*—*Buddhi* is knowledge or apprehension of anything. For instance, when I enjoy pleasure, I am conscious of the feeling pleasure and it is *Buddhi* which gives me this knowledge.

Buddhi is of two kinds—*Anubhava* and *Smarana*. *Anubhava* consists in forming

ideas of things and Smarana consists in remembering things and events as previously experienced

Manas or Mind

The sixth object of proof is *Manas* or mind. It is very difficult to define Manas. Generally speaking it is the central organ of perception. It arranges perceptions which appear in the field of consciousness either simultaneously or in quick succession into percepts or concepts. Manas or mind must not be confounded with the self or Atman. Manas, like the five senses, is an instrument of knowledge.

Thus we see that there are five perceptions of colour, taste, smell, touch, and sound with their five causes: light, water, earth, air, and ether, and to this another organ is added—Manas—the central organ of perception. Manas receives perceptions conveyed by the five sense-organs and arranges and elaborates them into percepts and concepts.

Manas is different from *Buddhi*. Per

ceptions arise in the field of consciousness and Buddhi takes each of them one by one, so to say, feels it and derives knowledge regarding it

Probritti or Activity

The seventh object of knowledge is Probritti or activity. Activity or will is the effort either of Sarira, body, or of Buddhi understanding, or of Bakya voice. To produce an action either of body or of understanding or of voice an effort is necessary and this putting forth of effort is what we call will or activity

Probritti is of two kinds—"Shuvarupa" and "Ashuvarupa" Probritti which is conducive to good action is known as "Shabharupa Probritti" and when it is conducive to bad action, it is known as 'Ashubharupa'

Dosha or Faults

The eighth object of knowledge is Dosha or fault. Those which cause or produce Probritti, are known as Dosha or Faults. Dosha is of three kinds — .

- (a) Raga—strong determination to perform an action, *eg* 'I must do this,'
- (b) Dvesha—Knowledge of some injury to myself which prevents me from performing an action or knowledge which prompts me to cause injury to others, is known as Dvesha
- (c) Moha—Knowledge which is false or fallacious is known as Moha

Thus it is seen that Raga, Dvesha, and Moha are the three sources of Probritti

Pretyabhava or Transmigration

The ninth object of knowledge is Pretyabhava or Transmigration : *e*, existence after death in another world. There is death after life and life after death and this succession of life and death is the law of nature. Death and life are inevitable to man so long he has not succeeded in freeing himself from this bondage by the attainment of true knowledge.

Phala or Rewards

The tenth object of knowledge is Phala or rewards which are the results produced by faults and by actions consequent on them. But all actions are ultimately productive of either pleasure or pain and hence rewards may be explained as consciousness of pleasure and pain. All actions ultimately result in either pleasure or pain. Such result is known as Mukhya Phala and results other than this are known as Gouna Phala.

Duhkha or Pain

The eleventh object of knowledge is Duhkha or pain. That, the absence of which is always desirable by man is pain—it is characterised by vexation.

Madhyamikas hold that there are three kinds of Duhkha—Adhyatmika, Adhibhautika and Adhidaibika—intrinsic, extrinsic and divine.

Apavarga or Final Beatitude

The last object of knowledge is Apavarga or Final Beatitude which means the total

annihilation of pain and this total annihilation of pain is the object of the Nyaya system.

Thus having enumerated the sources of knowledge and the objects of knowledge we now proceed to mention only the remaining topics.

CHAPTER IV.

Other Topics

Samasaya or Doubt.

Doubt arises when we recognise in one and the same object various attributes opposed to one another. When in dark we see a rope doubt arises as to whether it is a snake or a rope.

Prayojan or motive.

The object, desire of which gives rise to an activity is known as motive *i. e.* Prayojan. Every action implies an end, whenever we perform an action, we perform it for the attainment of an end and what that end can be but pleasure or annihilation of pain ? But it is not possible for us to attain an end

without attaining the means that are necessary for its realisation. Hence it follows that the means is as much a motive to an action as the end is, and the end as motive is known as Mukkha Prayojan and the means as motive is known as Gauna Prayojan.

The next topics are Dristanta or Example, and Siddhanta or Tenets

The statements which are accepted as true by the authors of the Shastras are known as Siddhantas—they are—

- (a) Sarba Tantra Siddhanta that which is accepted by all the Shastras, by the opposer and the opposed as well
- (b) Prati Tantra Siddhanta—that which is accepted by some and rejected by the rest—that which is accepted either by the opposer or by the opposed but not by both the opposer and the opposed
- (c) Adhikarana Siddhanta—when the proof of a certain thing gives rise to the proof of another thing with which it is concomitant When God is proved

as the creator of the universe it is also proved that he is the destroyer of it, because where there is creation there must be destruction also

- (d) *Abhyupagama Siddhanta*—when observation helps us in proving a thing when no particular mention of it is made in the Sūtras For instance, it is not mentioned in the Sūtras that mind is an organ but by observation we see that we can attribute to mind the function of organs

Avayavas or Premises

The members of a syllogism are known as Avayavas They are five in number—

- (a) *Protigna*, Assertion
- (b) *Hetu*, Reason
- (c) *Udaharana* or *Nidarsana*, Instance
- (d) *Upānaya*, Application
- (e) *Nigamana*, Conclusion

We see smoke on the mountain and infer that there is fire “The mountain is fiery” is the conclusion Let us analyse

the process which enables us to arrive at such conclusion Why the mountain is fiery? Because it smokes But because it smokes therefore it has fire, how do you know this? Wherever we have seen smoke we have seen fire as in the case of kitchen hearths and the like. Now when you see smoke on the mountain you will admit that it is fiery Hence the process of inference consists of the following steps —

- 1 The mountain has fire—

Pratigna or assertion

- 2 Because it has smoke—

Hetu or reason

- 3 Look at the kitchen hearth and remember the Vyapti between smoke and fire—

Udaharan or Nidarsana Instance

- 4 And the mountain has smoke--

Upanya or Application

- 5 Therefore it has fire—

Nigamana or conclusion

Tarka consists in refuting an assertion It means a *reductio ad absurdum* When

a person sees smoke on a hill but still refuses to admit that it is due to fire, thereupon he is made to see that if the hill were without fire, it would of necessity be without smoke

The next topic is *Nimaya* or ascertainment. Then comes *Vada* or argumentation. It consists in putting forth objections and meeting them by either party—the opposer and the opposed both caring for truth only. *Jalpa* or sophistical wrangling consists on the other hand, in attacking an established truth not by fair means but by foul means. *Jati* is futility, arising from false analogies. *Chhala* is quibbling and lastly *Nigrahasathan*, unfitness for discussion. A man who does not understand a subject or misunderstands it but still continues to argue, renders himself liable to reproof.

Thus we see that these are the sixteen topics with which the Nyaya System deals. But the question arises that if the system deals with such topics as soul, body, volition, sin, pain &c why should it be called the Nyaya-System, when Nyaya or Logic or

reasoning forms only an insignificant part of the topics with which the system deals ? To determine the destiny of soul is the aim of philosophy but its destiny cannot be determined without the full and perfect knowledge of all these things and reasoning is a necessary means to such knowledge. Hence Logic which is the art of reasoning gives man light to discover the truth of those things, the knowledge of which is, the only means to salvation and hence it is that Logic is called "the lamp of all the sciences". Therefore it is called the Nyaya System for the same reason for which the philosophy of Kant is called the Critical Philosophy. Kant based his philosophy on criticism of knowledge and therefore called it the Critical Philosophy, so also the Nyayikas ground their philosophy on Logic and therefore call it the Nyaya System or Logical Philosophy.

CHAPTER V

Nirvana

The Nyayaikas hold that the true means of attaining salvation is the knowledge of truth. Knowledge of truth delivers man from evil or pain and thereby enables him to attain the ultimate end and good.

They hold with Socrates and Plato that perfection of state can be attained by means of virtue. But what is virtue? Virtue is nothing but knowledge. Perfection depends on virtue which is or depends on knowledge. Socrates preached the doctrine that the more a man thinks the more he knows and the more he knows the better he acts and that the moral value of our acts is directly proportional to our knowledge of them. No one is voluntarily wicked and wickedness is the fruit of ignorance.

Now it is said that virtue is knowledge. But may we not raise the objection Does liberation from the evils of existence issue immediately on this knowledge being

attained ? Is salvation the direct and immediate and unconditional result of knowledge ? But if such be the case then how is it that man knows what is bad, yet does it—he knows what is good yet he does not perform it ? The answer is that it is not possible for man to do the worse even when he knows the better. As a matter of fact it is not the presence of knowledge but rather absence of it which makes him perform bad actions. The want of knowledge has implanted in us a variety of permanent effects and before the final end can be realised these permanent effects have to be removed one after another. But how to remove these permanent effects which serve as obstructions to our way to improvement ? It is the absence of knowledge which has created these obstacles and it is knowledge alone which can destroy them. What are the obstacles which ignorance has produced and what are they which knowledge can remove ? They are pain, birth, activity, faults, false notions

Pain

Pain is directly due to our birth. We are born as finite and imperfect beings and we are constantly being acted on and influenced by the surrounding world in which we are placed. We always struggle to adapt ourselves to the circumstances which are constantly changing and this constant struggle is the constant source of pain. Here we are at the mercy of the surrounding circumstances, we are dependent on them and the feeling of dependence can in no way be the source of pleasure.

Birth

Thus we see that birth is the cause of pain but birth again arises from activity—birth is the result of activity. Activity is an effort on the part of the self to preserve its individual finite existence in this world of finite things—it is an effort of self conservation and this effort continues to exist not only through this life but through all lives after it, and this effort it is which

makes the soul to be born again and again through successive existences, like a revolving wheel.

Activity.

This effort of self-conservation is the result of faults, defects or deficiencies. Activity consists in putting forth effort or energy, but why should we put forth our effort, why should we exert ourselves? We make an effort simply to escape from our faults from our defective state and to arrive at a state which is more perfect, which is more desirable

Faults

Fault again is the necessary result of ignorance. False notion is the cause of faults. Because we have false notions, because we are ignorant of truths, therefore we commit faults and mistakes. The most fundamental form of ignorance is the foolish belief that evils of individual existence can be overcome by the continual struggle of self-conservation—the foolish belief that the

more we struggle to adapt ourselves to needs and demands of circumstances the more shall we succeed in destroying the evils our life is beset with, but adapt ourselves we can not to the circumstances because they are in constant change

Ignorance

Thus we see that ignorance gives rise to faults, faults give rise to activity, activity to birth and birth to pain. These are the obstacles of life. If you wish to annihilate pain, you must free yourself from birth, for, birth is the cause of pain, if you wish to annihilate your birth, you must annihilate your activity for activity is the cause of birth, if you wish to keep yourself aloof from activity, you must do away with the faults and defects, for they alone give rise to activity if you wish to escape from faults you must escape from ignorance, for ignorance is the cause of faults. But how to escape from ignorance?

Knowledge

Knowledge is the only means which removes these obstructions because it gives us an insight into the true nature of soul and the world of finite things, it gives us an insight into the true relation of soul and the world ; and it gives us an insight into the nature and cause of pain. Thus knowledge corrects false notions for perfect knowledge will give us to understand that the body and its interests and the affairs of this world are not realities. Knowledge corrects our faults or sins, for perfect knowledge will enable us to know that the good of the body is not the good of the soul. It is ignorance which makes us think of the good of the body as the good of the soul and this false notion gives rise to desire, stupidity, passion anger, injury, theft, falsehood, malevolence and all forms of sinful activity which produce guilt or demerit. Knowledge at first accomplishes only a partial transformation of human nature—it produces alms giving, saving of others, truthfulness, benevolence

&c These are virtues, no doubt, but they are partial, because they are forms of activity and therefore include an effort of self-conservation, a striving to exist and thereby continue to promote rebirth, and pain is thus prolonged and the soul still goes on through a series of existences. Thus these half virtues cannot arrest the course of birth and rebirth.

But at last the wise man comes to see through all this illusion, understands the absolute truth and begins to understand that pain, birth activity, faults and false notions—at the successive annihilation of each there is the annihilation of the next preceding it. With absolute knowledge false notions disappear and along with them the faults are removed and with them activity ceases and the cessation of activity stops rebirth and with it pain ceases to exist, and with the cessation of pain comes final blessedness the ultimate end.

Thus we see that ignorance builds up the obstacles between soul and its blessedness,

and knowledge breaks down each of these one after another. But what is the meaning of this Nirvana or cessation of pain? It seems to involve in some sense cessation of birth and thereby of finite existence. Does it then imply a total annihilation of conscious being? Does it imply a falling back into the sleep of nothingness as Schopenhauer assumes?

Schopenhauer

The philosophy of Schopenhauer is a peculiar combination of Fichtian idealism with Schellingian realism. We are here concerned however with his practical Philosophy. Evil is nothing accidental but has its origin in the Absolute Will itself *viz* in its abandoning its original state of rest, inertia inactivity. It abandoned this original state of inactivity and entered on a mad career of activity and thereby resolved itself into a world of finite things and finite wills. The blind effort of absolute will communicates itself to finite minds and finite life becomes a mad struggle to attain an end

which cannot be attained and that end is happiness or conscious blessedness. As in the Nyaya System we find there are obstacles between soul and its blessedness, so here also there are obstacles known as metaphysical and moral evils. Finite wills make a desperate effort to attain individual happiness, they blindly enter into competition with one another and thereby destroy one another's happiness. Thus they defeat their own purpose by rendering the attainment of happiness impossible. Not only so, but the end for which they struggle is, by its very nature, altogether unattainable. The very existence of consciousness is painful, for consciousness must be the consciousness of limitation, of defect, of want and where there is defect or want there must be pain. If there were no limitation there would be no consciousness, hence limitation there must be for the existence of consciousness and hence consciousness must of necessity be painful, if it were to cease to be such, it would cease to be consciousness.

Therefore it follows that finite life is essentially and hopelessly evil both morally and metaphysically. Is there then any redemption—any means of escaping from the misery of existence into a state of rest—Moksha or Nirvana? The answer is in the affirmative and is the same as the answer of the Nyaiyaka to the same question. Redemption is possible only by putting a stop to individual existence and thereby coming back to the original repose of the one universal will. But how to annihilate individual existence, how to go back to its original state of repose? When finite wills become generally convinced of the hopelessness and wickedness of their individual existence, then all striving and therefore all production of finite existences would cease and all finite existences would fall back into the unity and repose of the absolute will in its original condition and this is the real Nirvana, the highest good, to be striven for.

Thus the will evolves the intellect and it

serves as a light to guide it towards the highest good *viz* perfect blessedness. This highest good, owing to false notions, appears at first to consist of happy consciousness and it seems to be attainable by means of finite conscious individualities. A time however, comes at last, when intellect finds all these to be an illusion and the disillusion of finite wills by means of intellect extends at last to absolute will and produces the universal negation of striving and thereby of life.

Perhaps the Nyayaikas mean to maintain that the loss of finite individual existence leaves behind it still conscious but happier form of existence—an existence which is not bound down to any particular place or time, which is general and universal. But would not this also imply absorption of the individual into a universal consciousness? If the individual consciousness be absorbed into the universal consciousness would there then be any continuity between the consciousness of the individual and that of the universal mind in which it is contained? Does not this

absorption imply total annihilation of individual consciousness ? But is it not a fact that the Nyayaikas maintain the individuality of the soul in some sense

What is the nature of soul ? What is its ultimate fate ? These are the questions which have attracted constant attention of all philosophers of all places and ages. Thales ascribed soul to magnets and declared that the whole world was full of souls. The essential nature of individual souls was sought at first in that which had been recognised as the moving principle in the whole. Anaximenes found it in air. Heraclitus and Parmenides in fire, Leucippus in the fiery atoms and Anaxagoras in the world moving rational substance, the *nous*. Empedocles regarded soul as a substance which streams through the living body, and the blood. Diogenes of Apollonia held that the essence of the soul consisted in the air mixed with the blood. The Pythagoreans conceived the moving principle of the world as One but this One could not be considered

as the same with the individual soul. In the atomistic systems the soul consists only of atoms. According to Democritus the soul consists of the same atoms which constitute also the essence of fire—they are the finest, smoothest, and the most mobile. Plato speaks of the two-fold aspect of soul. It is, on the one hand, the living element, it is moved of itself and it moves other things. It is, on the other hand, that which perceives, knows and wills. Therefore soul as the principle of life and of motion belongs to the lower world of Becoming, it is here that it perceives and directs its desires towards objects of the senses. The same soul by its true knowledge of the Ideas also partakes in the higher reality of abiding Being. Hence an intermediate position must be assigned to it between the two worlds. Here for the first time, personal immortality is brought forward by Plato in the Western Philosophy. With Aristotle there are three souls. The vegetative soul is the first form of organic life, it forms the mechanical and chemical change.

to the purposive functions of assimilation and propagation. The animal soul is susceptible of pleasure and pain, it strives for an agreeable impression upon it and shuns the contrary, its constitutive characteristics are spontaneous motion in space and sensation. The human soul possesses the endowments of animal life and in addition to these possesses the faculty of knowledge or reason. When soul is sensation, imagination, memory and will, it suffers the fate of all earthly things and it is perishable. When soul is the active intellect, when it is the pure reason, and when it conceives the universal and the divine, it enjoys the privilege of immortality. The Stoics hold that the individual soul is *pneuma* fiery breath, it is the vital force of the body, it holds together and rules the flesh. The individual soul is only a part of the universal World Soul. This World Soul determines its nature and its activity. It is consubstantial with the divine *Pneuma* and dependent upon it. As regards the individual immortality

various views are current in the schools, some recognise the duration of all souls until the time of the universal conflagration and others reserve this for the wise only. The Epicureans hold that soul is a fiery atmospheric breath and they also try to draw a distinction between the rational and irrational parts of the soul. The Alexandrians emphasised not only the pure spirituality and incorporeality of God but likewise the incorporeality of the individual soul. For Plotinus the soul is out and out doubled. It is the higher soul when sunk into the blissful contemplation of the Ideas and as formative power it is the lower soul. Leibnitz speaks of it as 'monad' and Locke calls it a blank tablet. Immortality of soul is a necessary postulate with Kant.

CHAPTER VI

Snares of the Nyaya System

"Absolute abolition of pain is the only Summum bonum" holds the Nyaya System. But is this 'absolute summum bonum' at all

attainable? It is as much beyond the reach of man as the treacle of the elbow is beyond that of the tongue. The Nyāyaikas would meet this objection by saying that all the schools of philosophy agree in regarding abolition of pain as the great end and pain cannot exist without the activity of the individual, for, we have seen that so long there is activity there is pain. Therefore when the Mādhyamikas hold that liberation consists in the abolition of soul, they accept the Nyāya principle of the cessation of pain, for, with the cessation of soul, activity must cease and with it pain which necessarily follows from activity. It is maintained by the Mādhyamikas that abolition of pain is only possible when the soul is abolished, hence to escape from pain it is necessary to abolish soul. But this theory of them cannot be maintained. What is Soul? We may take it either in the empirical sense or in the metaphysical sense. Empirically speaking it is a series of conscious states and processes—an aggre

gate of feeling, thinking and willing. Metaphysically speaking it is something which is different therefrom—something which feels, thinks and wills. Feeling cannot feel itself, thinking cannot think itself and willing cannot will itself, therefore there must be a subject which feels, thinks, and wills, and self is this subject. If self be taken in the empirical sense as the series of conscious states, the Nyaiyaikas have got nothing to say for, these states are evanescent and they are the causes of activity and thereby of rebirth which is the cause of pain. Hence destruction of the cognitive efforts will give rise to the destruction of activity which is the cause of rebirth and thereby of pain. But if it be understood in the metaphysical sense as substance or subject then its abolition is impossible, at least is not desirable. Annihilation of pain is the summum bonum but summum-bonum for whom? It must be the summum-bonum of the self? It is the self which strives to attain it. It is the self in which

the summum bonum is realised. But if such self be destroyed what value the summum bonum can possibly have had? Thus we see that there is no reason to assert that cessation of pain is an impossible task when we see that it can be abolished only if we succeed in arresting the course of rebirth by annihilating activity.

Again it may be urged, why not say with the Joga-charas and the Soutrantikas that the summum bonum is pure intelligence—intelligence as it is when it is absorbed into universal intelligence? But such absorption requires means, and what can be the means of it if not intelligence? Moreover such absorption of soul is altogether meaningless for such absorption of soul means loss of soul altogether. When soul becomes absorbed into the universal soul, what remains of the individual soul? If liberation of soul means delivery from limits and absorption into the infinite then it would cease to be soul in the former sense, for, the former self is limited and individual, while the latter is soul

after liberation, is infinite and universal. The Nyayaikas seem then to assume that when all feelings have been destroyed, when all efforts have been removed, the soul still continues to retain some kind of individuality.

The Jainas describe that liberation of the soul consists in deliverance from obstructions, but what do they mean by obstructions? Do they mean demerit and error, false notions and faults? If so, the Nyayaikas agree with them and grant their theory. But if they mean, as they seem to mean, that body is the true obstruction and that liberation is the escaping of the soul from its body with which it is connected, then the Nyayaikas find no way to agree with them. What is soul apart from body? Either it has form or it is without any form. If it has a particular form then it must have parts and if it has parts then it must be perishable and if it be perishable, then what the soul has done in this life will also perish with it and thence there will be no reward or punishment after death, and what one endures or enjoys can

have no connection with what he has done in a past life. We cannot help without believing in a future life.

Future Life

We are endowed with moral principles and feelings. We can judge, of ourselves, what is right and what is wrong. This judgment is not a cold and unmoving conclusion but it is accompanied with feeling of approbation or disapprobation. Now, whence arises this feeling? When we perform any good and virtuous action we feel satisfaction. Whence comes this inward glow of satisfaction? When we perform any wrong or unworthy action we feel the pang of compunction and remorse. Whence comes this pang? Do they not proceed from the belief and conviction that good conduct deserves and will obtain approbation and reward, while vicious conduct deserves and will receive condemnation and punishment? Our conscience exercises judgement within us but the voice of this conscience is meaningless without a reference to a higher

tribunal and stricter reckoning. The feelings of satisfaction or of remorse which we now experience are indications and beginnings of what we may hereafter be called to suffer or to enjoy. c

God has given us conscience—a faculty which enables us to distinguish between right and wrong and He has endowed us with a susceptibility of suitable emotions arising from the discernment of right and wrong. When God has given us such faculty and such susceptibility, it is impossible to assume that He himself should remain insensible to the distinction between good and evil. It is therefore quite natural that we should expect, in the government of the world, God should manifest his love of virtue by rewarding the virtuous and He should manifest his hatred of vice by punishing the vicious.

But if soul be perishable as it must be if we assume that it has parts, then there can be no continuity between present and past, between present and future—there can be no moral order in the world.

If it be argued that soul has form but no parts, then it agrees with the definition of atom, for atom is that which has form without parts, and as the attributes of atom are imperceptible to the senses so also those of the soul

Again, if it be assumed, that soul has no form, then what warrant the Jainas have to speak of it as "escaping from body", when such phrase implies position in space and time and therefore form?

We conclude, therefore that in seeking liberation, the obstruction which the soul has to overcome is not merely the burden of the body but of something more

The Charvakas hold that dependence on the will of other persons is the only bondage and true liberation consists in freeing one's self from such bondage which is undesirable and hence painful. But that such liberation is not possible follows from the very nature of man. To be independent of man is to live an isolated life which is impossible. "It is as true that man is dependent upon

his fellows as that a limb is dependent upon the body. It would be absurd to ask what would be the properties of a man who was not a product of the race, as to ask what would be the properties of a leg not belonging to an animal, or to ask what would be the best type of man without considering his place in society, as to ask what would be the best kind of leg without asking whether it belonged to a hare or a tortoise." "The individual owes his individuality not merely to the relation in which he stands to society, but also to the relation in which he stands to nature. This position in nature is part of his individuality just as much as his position in society." "The individual is not less vitally related to society than the hand or foot to the body. Nor is it merely that each individual is dependent for life and protection upon society, as the hand or foot is dependent for its nourishment upon the body, but he is dependent on his relation to society for the particular form of his individuality. It is the function it

performs in virtue of its special place in the organism which makes the hand a hand and the foot a foot. In the same way it is the place and function in society which makes the individual what he is" & It follows, therefore that all earthly existence involves dependence of one person on another and there is no escape from being either servant or master in some degree. Dependence there must be and such dependence may be increased or diminished but it can never be destroyed, and true summum bonum is that which can neither be increased nor diminished. Hence the true summum bonum is something which is quite different from what the Charvakas maintained.

The Sankhyas hold that there are two self-existent substances—Soul and Nature. They are essentially independent and distinct and unconnected. The aim of the Sankhya System is to make impossible human pain

by arresting the course of transmigration which it professes to accomplish by means of science as consisting of a thorough knowledge of the developed principle or the world, of the undeveloped principle or nature, and of the soul." The soul entered into nature from eternity, and derives from nature the senses and powers which form its primarily incorporeal organisation or its primitive body, from which the present body of its visible mode of existence is to be distinguished, as having arisen in time. In this union of nature and spirit all activity and change belongs only to the former, the soul maintaining the position of a quiet spectator and remaining in itself. There also what binds the spirit to nature is a mere deception or blindness, these are the sources of the spirit's suffering under changing circumstances which though in reality foreign to it it regards as its own. As soon as it sees through this delusion, and knows itself in its difference from nature and its unchangeable simplicity, the charm, which bound it to the

world of sense is broken , it has become inwardly free or redeemed " In short, liberation of soul consists in soul's becoming separate again and free from the influence of nature, as it was originally

But the question arises —Is it soul that tries to separate itself from matter or is it matter that tries to separate itself from soul ? Wherein lies the cognition of the difference of soul and matter—the cognition which is the means of liberation ? Does it lie in matter or in soul ? It cannot be the soul which tries to separate itself from matter, for, the Sankhyas hold that it is unchangeable When it discovers that it is in contact with matter, and when it comes to know that this contact is the source of its misery and when it struggles to free itself from matter, then activity is implied on its part, but can there be any activity without a change ? And does not this struggle imply a change—change from ignorance to knowledge, from quiescence to agitation ? But how can there be a change in a thing

which is itself unchangeable ? Change is in consistent with the very nature of soul

Nor can it be nature which tries to extricate itself from soul, for, the Sankhyas hold that nature itself is unintelligent and unconscious, it is subject to no influence outside of itself, and whether it be active or inactive it must be so spontaneously and not consciously. If it be inactive spontaneously then there would be no world, because world is a process of active change—a product of evolution. If it be spontaneously active, then there would be no hope of the Soul's attaining perfect liberation because as nature is self-existent, it is eternal and hence its activity which is spontaneous is also eternal and hence it can neither be avoided nor can be set aside.

Bhatta Sarvajna and his followers preach that liberation consists in the attainment of eternal happiness—happiness which can neither be increased nor diminished. But how can we know that there is such a thing as eternal happiness ? Certainly our perception cannot tell us that there is such

a thing as eternal happiness. It is established by Sruti ? But Sruti itself must have its beginning in perception at a particular time, if it had no such beginning then it might tell us any thing and every thing and would have us believe in things unreal and imaginary, and would have imposed upon us any absurdity. And from the analysis of mental processes we can know that it is absolutely impossible for perception to establish such a thing as eternal happiness and hence no such thing has been perceived at any time by any mind.

The Nyayaikas also seek a state of perfect blessedness which can be attained by the annihilation of pain. But this blessedness or happiness is quite different from happiness as ordinarily understood. By happiness they mean feeling which is closely connected with its opposite pain. Hence happiness is a state which is neither pleasurable nor painful.

It may also be urged against the Nyaya-System how is it that it does not seek happi-

ness but it seeks annihilation of pain, it does not try to attain something which is positive but tries to avoid something—it tries to attain something negative? Just as a dyspeptic patient refuses sweet milk but prefers rice gruel, so the Nyayaikas hold that liberation consists not in seeking happiness but avoiding pain—they refuse happiness and prefer absence of pain. But what is happiness? Can there be any such thing as absolute happiness? Happiness is inconceivable without pain—it implies pain, it is included under the Category of pain, it can not be without pain. As there is no honey without poison so there is no pleasure without pain. It always admits of degrees, it can be increased it can be decreased, it is never free from hostile influences, it is always dependent on conditions, in short, it is never complete pleasure. Hence happiness, pure and simple, can never be attained by endeavouring to attain it. The more we seek pleasure the less we gain it. Happiness is either the cause or effect of pain. Happi

ness is inseparably connected with pain. We cannot therefore escape from pain by seeking happiness. A man who seeks to avoid pain by seeking happiness may very well be compared with a man who grasps a red hot iron ball under the illusion that it is gold. We may satisfy our desires by the enjoyment of objects got by right means, but this satisfaction is like the flashes of fire—it is temporary and fleeting. One satisfaction creates craving in us for another and that for another and so on.

Therefore we should not make an attempt to secure liberation by seeking happiness which can never be directly attained but we should seek it by annihilating pain. By the providence of the Supreme Being and by an honest faith in the revelations of God man may attain real knowledge of the true nature of soul which enables him to determine that true liberation consists in absolute deliverance from pain.

CHAPTER VII

God

Thus we see that the Nyāikas believe in the existence of God. How do they know that there is a God—the author and governor of the universe? Is it by perception or inference or Śruti?

Perception

Certainly perception cannot prove the existence of God. We can perceive those things only which have forms. Things devoid of form cannot be perceived by the senses. God has no form for He is unlimited. Therefore God cannot be perceived by the senses and in sensuous perception we can not go beyond our senses.

Inference

Inference cannot prove the existence of God. We cannot infer from the world to God, for to pass from one thing to another a third thing is necessary. We cannot establish a relation between two terms without a third term. Inference supposes a

middle term But where is that middle term by which we can infer from the world to God, where is that universal major from which we can deduce his existence

Inference supposes the notion of essence which always remains identical with itself. It supposes that things of the same class are always identical and the same cause always produces the same effect In an inference a relation is established between a class essence and another attribute and it is shown that another thing shares in that class-essence and therefore it must also possess that attribute *e g*

All man is mortal

Socrates is man

. Socrates is mortal.

First of all it is shown that mortality is connected with the essence of man This essence, as it is the essence of man, must remain wherever there is man and as mortality is connected with this essence, there cannot be a man without mortality Secondly it is shown that Socrates has

this essence because he is a man and as such he must share in the essence of man which makes man to be man. Thirdly it is shown that what is true of man is also true of Socrates, *e. Socrates is mortal*. Therefore it follows that the notion of essence is necessary and the notion of essence can be formed by analysing things into their constituent elements, by comparing these constituent elements in order to find out the common elements, by abstracting those essential elements from the non-essential ones and lastly by unifying them and assigning a name to them. Therefore inference cannot be applied to God; because He is a single instance He can neither be classified nor can be compared. We cannot say that He is like this thing or that. No conclusion can, therefore, be drawn as regards God because He has no common essence with us to serve as middle term.

Śruti Revelation.

Śruti cannot prove the existence of God. For it is either eternal or non eternal. Eterna

it is not. Then how can it prove the existence of God ? God exists because He has revealed himself in the Vedas , the Veda is a divine revelation, because God exists This sort of argument involves a vicious circle. We must first of all satisfy ourselves that God exists and then proceed to show, if possible, that the Veda is a divine revelation

Is it then that the Supreme Being is as unreal as the horn of a hare ? The Nyayaikas hold that all this argumentation is an idle sophistry and can easily be regulated by the old argument from effect to cause We find around us a world of admirable regularity and admirable diversity The very aspect of our globe is so beautifully diversified, is so regularly harmonious ! Earth and air, land and water, hill and dale, rocks and mountains, flowery meadows and dark forest are interspered with one another in beautiful variety and wonderful diversity We meet around us with innumerable instances of things and of beings, seperate and indepen-

dent, combining or conspiring to the attainment of some ends. Thus all the things of the world have the nature of effects and whatever has the nature of effect must have a cause, for there can be no effect without a cause—where there is effect, cause there must be. As this world bears the marks of effect it must have a cause and what cause can there be of it, if not God ?

Here in the idea of effect we get the middle term and major premise which carries us from the world as effect to God the cause. Now what is the nature of the middle term ? What is the nature of effect ? What are the marks which make a thing an effect ? Does the world possess those marks ?

When different things are brought together, when they are made to be parts of one whole, when they are made to co operate with one another and when they are made to serve one common purpose we know that this has been done by a power other than the things themselves. In this world also we see that there are signs of gradation,

selection and combination—that all things are made to serve one purpose. Therefore it is an effect and it must have a cause and the cause must be an intelligent great one *viz* God.

We find the signs of effect in this world in the wonderful array of powers and faculties with which man is endowed and the triumphs which they have achieved in the wonderful harmony between the constitution of the mind of man and the arrangements of that external world in which he lives and moves and has his being, in the admirable connection between the faculties of the mind and the powers of the body and the subordination of the one to the other. We find evidence of effect in this world in the breath of wind which blows upon the surface of the earth, in the heavens bright with innumerable worlds, in the bright and mystic dance of the sparkling stars, in the position and movements of the heavenly bodies, in the curious structures and wonderful appetencies of the organised and living beings.

Now here the controversy takes another direction. You speak of the parts of things (see page 184.) But what do you mean by parts? When you say 'a thing has parts' do you mean to say that it is in contact with the parts—the parts are attached to it—they are put on to it? This might be the meaning with some external things such as ether. They are self-existent and hence they are not effects. Or do you mean to say that it is composed of parts they are intimately related to it?

The answer to the question is this, A thing possesses parts means it exists in and by its parts. Take, for instance, box, it exists in and by its parts—it has sides, bottom, handle, lid &c—here the parts are put together to make one whole thing and serve one purpose. When we see a box and see that it has parts but they are put together to serve one purpose we know that some designing power has done it.

Now examining the composition and adaptation of the world we can form a major

premiss which will help us in inferring the existence of God "Whatever partakes of the nature of being composite and adapted must have had a maker" This proposition cannot be contradicted because its opposite cannot be proved—it cannot be proved that there may be design without a designer. And this is a true universal proposition, for it cannot be proved that there are some such things without makers. A single evidence may be sufficient to prove the existence of God but one will have to study the whole universe to prove His non existence.

Is it always the case that a universal major gives a true conclusion ? Yes it does, provided it be a real and true universal proposition. Take an instance

All things that smoke have fire

Lakes smoke

Lakes have fire

Here the conclusion is false and fallacy lies in the major premiss which is not a true universal proposition because only some things that give out vapour have fire. Here

the middle term is undistributed, for properly stated the syllogism would stand thus—

Some smoking things have fire
Lakes are smoking things
Lakes have fire

But our major premiss on which the theistic argument is based is free from any such fallacy

It might be urged that as the world was not produced by a bodily maker, it was not produced at all. But this argument involves the fallacy of *petitio principii*. It assumes that no corporeal agent was the author of this world and it further assumes what is not produced by a corporeal agent is not at all produced. This is an arbitrary assertion.

We conclude then that this world has its maker. But what is the nature of this maker? He is a personal being, He has volition to act, He has desire to prompt his will, He is intelligent and has knowledge of the proper means for attaining His end. He sets in motion all causes the permutation and

combination of which give rise to the world of things and minds and He himself is set in motion by knowledge

Causality in so far as we have any direct cognition of it is a function of the self or ego or mental principle from which it originates—which puts forth energy for the realisation of conscious end. Hume, however, reduces the relation of cause and effect to that of constant conjunction and contends that we have no proper idea of cause as implying power to produce, not of any necessary connection between the operation of this power and the production of the effect, All that we see or know is mere succession, antecedent and consequent Causation consists in nothing more than precedence in time The idea of substance has nothing to do with it ; the idea of production does not enter into it Cause is the invariable, and Mill adds unconditional antecedent Mill, however, finds the difficulty of Hume's theory and to avoid the objections urged against it, says that by cause we should understand

"invariable unconditional antecedent". But this is really shifting the ground—admitting that causality is something more than mere succession. The invariable sequence, though not itself causation, is the convenient test by which we discover the presence of causality. A phenomenon cannot be the cause of another phenomenon. The idea of the productive power is involved in the idea of cause. So some power or force existing along with a phenomenon is regarded as cause. What is the evidence of this principle? Man universally uses the word 'force'. It is impossible for him to express such things as force, energy, motion &c in terms of the succession theory. Even the phenomenologists use such expressions as "action and reaction are equal", "the bullet pierces the wall" and so on—and they imply the idea of force.

Thus we see that causality implies force. But what is the source of this productive power? The observation of the objective world cannot answer the question for it is

made up of things and phenomena and changes of things and hence we must have re-course to the observation of the subjective world. Self consciousness is the source of the idea of causality or power of producing change. Consciousness of self as subject implies that it is permanent, that it has the power of self preservation and self development and that it is a permanent centre of energy.

It follows, therefore, that causality in so far as we have any direct cognition of it is a function of the self or ego or mental principle from which it originates—which puts forth energy for the realisation of conscious end. Now, the question is Whence the mind gets its force ? or whence comes the mind force ? Different answers are possible.

It may be said that the mind creates or produces this force somehow or other from within itself as many think or imply. But this however is inconsistent with the modern doctrine of the conservation of energy which assumes that the amount of energy in

the world is always constant For, according to this view every volition would add a unity of new force to the sum total

It may be said that mind merely puts forth force which it has already taken in from nature Mind returns to nature in the form of volition the force which it previously received from nature through organism, so that it produces nothing but is merely a store, as it were, in which a part of the force of nature is received stored up and given out again in another way But whence nature gets her force ?

It may be said that the mental principle in man may be supposed to be in connection with or a finite factor of the *absolute power which makes the world*, so that the energy which it exercises is a factor of the absolute, central divine energy which makes and sustains the world There is one absolute energy underlying and evolving all things, and the human will or power is but one of the finite manifestations of this infinite power This is the view of Aristotle, Spinoza, Leib

nitz Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer Lotze and the British Hegelian Sterling Green, Caird etc

Now this idea of causality is extended to nature by analogy and inference, the causality which we are directly conscious of only within ourselves

The conclusion is that the only causality which we directly know is a function of self—a factor of volition exercised for the realisation of conscious ends. There is no other causality which is not originated by mind. Hence whatever force is not originated by myself or by any other finite minds must have been originated by an infinite mind. Hence we must infer the existence of God as infinite and source of the forces of nature. The forces of nature are the permanent volition of God.

The world of nature consists of a plurality of phenomena. How the one infinite conscious will produces this plurality? Sense-consciousness stimulated by the force of resistance implies the existence of something

other than ourselves—the physical universe and a Will underlying it. But how this single will can account for the plurality of forces in nature—such as gravitation, heat, light, electricity etc? Recently science itself, however, has been trying to show them all to be the different modes of a single ultimate force. Leaving aside what science has to tell we can meet the question in two ways. We can account for every phenomenon by a special volition on the part of God but this is to question the infinite power of God. But we can account for the plurality of natural phenomena by the interaction and intermixture of a small number of original “Standing Volition” and in this way we can account for the plurality of natural phenomena without supposing a special volition for each of them.

Hence we conclude that without a combining and guiding power the other causes could not act at all nor produce anything. Hence if we reject the idea of a designing cause we must reject the collateral causes also ;

and we should have the monstrous doctrine that effects can be without a cause.

Thus we see that the Nyayaikas starting from the purely causal and cosmological argument, rise gradually, like Paley, Martineau, Flint, etc., to the Teleological form of argument, and then they proceed to deal with the objections raised against this form of argument as given by Spinoza, Kant and many others

Objections to the Teleological Argument

The Nyayaikas next proceed to deal with the common objections raised against the Teleological argument "It is roundly asserted that there is no real evidence of purpose in nature, and that even if there seem to be, it all comes to nothing. It proves nothing, and disproves nothing, and even if it proved the utmost that the Theist desires to prove, it proves nothing of what he is especially concerned to assert. There is said to be neither room nor need for purpose, now, that we know what natural selection can do. The gradualness

of evolution, we are told, means a self acting mechanism, so that all instances of adaptation are only delusive appearances. There are too many trifles, too much waste, too many rudimentary organs, too manifest imperfections, too really dangerous and hurtful contrivances, to permit of any thought of divine intention. At the utmost only a great architect external to nature could be inferred from such an argument, even if the assumed analogy between human and divine work were allowed. Whilst on the other hand there is so much of evil and suffering in the world, that if the argument were pressed it would only lead to a deistic monster. Such is the list of difficulties." It may also be urged that if the world was created by a God, He must have an end in view. What is that end? Is it His own advantage or the advantage of other beings? If He created the world for His own advantage then was it to attain something desired, was it to satisfy some want, was it to avoid something not desired or to overcome some danger or re;

move some defect ? In any case it makes God an imperfect being—a being having some want. But is not such want or defect inconsistent with the conception of God who is perfect ? Such want or defect is possible only in the case of beings who are finite and limited and imperfect. Therefore it cannot be maintained that God created the world for His own advantage.

If it is supposed that God created the world for the advantage of other beings, then certainly we cannot give Him the credit of being wise, for, we cannot call a being wise who works solely for others. If his activity was moved by compassion, then certainly He would have made all living beings happy and perfect but He has not done so. On the other hand He has placed them in a world which is full of troubles and anxieties, pain and misery, want and death. Hence compassion could not have been the motive of creation as evidenced by the existing evils of nature. Thus we see that there can be no valid argument from the world as effect

to the existence of God as cause. The Nyaiyakas would reply with Leibnitz by saying that "if God produced always the best 'He would produce other Gods,' but this is an error, for, 'if they were Gods, it would have been impossible to produce them, moreover, if, to suppose the impossible, each created substance were perfect, all substances would be equal and similar to one another, which would not constitute a whole that was in itself the best' We must also bear in mind that this world is a system of moral probation wherefore beings are to be disciplined and educated into moral perfection. Moral training supposes freedom of will, freedom of will consists in choosing what is good and avoiding what is evil. Hence freedom of will or morality supposes the existence of evil. And we must remember that the world is a progressive system. It is a hierarchy of means to ends. The supreme end is being realised through this hierarchy of ends. Hence we can interpret the world only by reference to the ultimate

end If it be asked why the laws of nature are so bad ? We cannot answer such question, for, such great cosmic laws are entirely beyond the criticism of finite beings like our selves whose knowledge is necessarily limited, but we can see that physical sufferings and sin do not conflict with the benevolence of God The question is often asked "why did not God so create us that we should do what is good only " " Why did he admit sin into the world " " God wishes to make us morally perfect and moral perfection, as we have seen, presupposes freedom of will which implies the possibility of sin for, if moral evil were impossible then self elevation and moral culture too would be impossible Moral culture means evils overcome Will not that world be an unmoral world where moral perfection is given by God and not earned by man ? God is the author of our possibilities and we are the authors of our actualities The evil in the world will be the accumulated results of the evil actions of finite beings and not directly the creation of God If God

directly determined all our actions then they would be natural and not moral events.

It can be urged again that when God gives freedom to man He imposes limitations, restrictions and hardships upon himself and thereby makes him like a finite being susceptible of being interfered with and opposed and defeated in his work. The answer is that such limitations on the part of God are self imposed. He voluntarily limits his own power, and inhibits His own infinite activity. Such self imposed limitations are in no way opposed to God's absolute power.

Theories of Evil

Evil is negative with Plotinus and is equal to matter. Plotinus holds that evil is something which is not itself positively existent. It is want or deficiency, it is absence of the good. *Non being*. If evil has no existence then there is no necessity of justifying it. The world is good "so far as it has part in God or the Good i.e. *so far as it is*, and on the other hand it is *evil* in so far as it has part in matter or the Evil i.e. *in so*

far as it is not. Evil proper, the true evil is matter, negation; the corporeal world can be called evil only because it is formed out of matter: it is secondary evil, and the predicate "evil" belongs to souls only if they give themselves over to matter."

The Patristic doctrine of evil is that God provided the spirits and the human souls which he created with a freedom which was analogous to his own and it is through their guilt arising from free will that evil came into the good world. Clement of Alexandria expresses this fact by saying that evil is not a substance, but it is only an action and hence it cannot be regarded as the work of God. Augustine also holds that the corporeal world is created out of nothing by divine power, wisdom and goodness, and bears in its beauty and perfection the sign of its origin. Evil is nothing properly real, it is not a thing but an act, it has no *causa efficiens*, but only a *causa deficiens*, its origin is to be sought not in the positive Being (God), but in the lack of Being of finite natures; for these latter, as

having been created, possess, only a weakened and therefore a defective reality.' The primary cause of evil is to be found according to Leibnitz in the essential limits of the creature. Evil is one of the conditions of the greatest good

THE VEDANTA SYSTEM.

CHAPTER I

Lakshana of Brahman.

The foundation of the Vedanta System lies on the Vedic saying 'Tattvamasi', 'Thou art That' The aim of the Vedanta is to establish the essential identity between the individual soul and the supreme soul The fundamental doctrine of the system may be expressed by saying that the only true being is Brahman and the world is false Brahman is nothing but the soul "There is nothing worth gaining, there is nothing worth-enjoying, there is nothing worth-knowing but Brahman alone for he who knows Brahman is Brahman"

In order to understand the exact

significance of the above statement it is necessary to draw a distinction between phenomenal and noumenal existence. We must distinguish between existence as it is and existence as it appears to our senses. Everything has two aspects—the phenomenal aspect, thing as manifesting in terms of our sensations and the noumenal aspect, thing as it is in itself, behind and independent of the phenomena in which it manifests itself. The phenomenal world, the world as it appears to our senses has no real existence of itself except to and for our senses. This phenomenal world is derivative and secondary. It depends on conditions lying outside of itself. This phenomenal world can have no real existence of its own. Therefore there must be an absolute reality underlying it and this absolute reality is Brahman—*natura naturata*. The soul as soul does not in its essence belong to the phenomenal world but rather a function of Brahman.

Lakshana or Definition

Definition is of two kinds—Essential defi

nition (Svarupa Lakshana) and Accidental definition (Tatastha Lakshana) The former is an explicit statement of the essential character of an object and the latter is an explicit statement of its extraneous character The former states the essence of an object—the essence without which the thing would cease to be what it is Hence this definition is perfect

But how can we know the essence of a thing? Knowledge implies discrimination and assimilation and hence our knowledge is exclusively relative Therefore what we can know is not the essence of the thing but the relation of the thing to other objects Therefore what is possible is accidental definition and not essential But the Vedantists hold that the essence is not unknowable The essence is permanent and abiding and constantly remains identical with itself "To get at the essence of a thing one has, the Vedantists maintain, to discriminate between the real and the unalterable substratum which determines its *existence* and the acci

dental attributes which determine the particular name and form (*namarupa*) which it temporally assumes. Ultimately this process of discrimination leads one to differentiate the absolute and immutable substratum of existence from the universal and primary energy from which all names and forms (*i.e.* mutations) proceed, the former the Vedantists identify with Brahman, and the latter with the energy of Maya which they refer back to Brahman as a Sakti or power appertaining to Him. The objection based on the unknowableness of the essence is therefore untenable. We may first learn to discriminate the essential from the accidental in our own selves, and by extending this study we may do the same in other objects."

Swarupa Lakshan of Brahman

Brahman is *sat chid anandam*. His constitutive characters are that He is real, that He is reason and perfect bliss. All other objects derive their reality from Brahman for He alone is the real being, all other reason is but the reproduction under limitation

of His reason and all other happiness is but the faint reflexion of eternal happiness which attends the infinitude of Brahman. Brahman is the sole reality. Objects are real because they participate in God's reality, beings are rational because they share in His universal reason and they are capable of enjoying perfect happiness only when they have succeeded in removing the evil of ignorance only which prevents him from seeing the essential identity between Brahman and Jivas.

Brahman is the only reality and He can not be called the product of mutation for, the very existence of mutation presupposes the existence of a reality underlying it. Phenomena cannot exist by themselves. Phenomena are the appearances or manifestations and appearances or manifestations must be the manifestations of some thing which is permanent and abiding, which produces changes without being itself changed and this permanent something is Brahman.

Tatastha Lakshan of Brahman

Brahman is the originator, preserver and

destroyer of the universe which comprises within its scope the totality of mutations. The universe owes its existence in Brahman, continues its existence in Brahman and becomes absorbed in the end in Brahman. In a word Brahman is the cause of the world but in what sense He can be regarded as the cause of the world ?

CHAPTER II

Causality of Brahman

Causality is of two kinds—efficient causality, *nimittakaranata* and material causality, *upadan karanata*. Brahman is the cause of the world in both the senses—He is the producer and the sustainer of the universe. He is the producer of the world process and the world process is grounded on Him.

Thus the Idealistic doctrine of Vedanta is in opposition to the Dualistic doctrines of the Nyaya and the Sankhya Systems. The Nyaya System maintains the co-eternal existence of atoms. God is self-existent but He must have materials to work upon and the atoms supply Him with the materials.

and God gives shape and form to the atoms. This system makes God to be an architector only. The Sankhya system on the contrary, asserts that there are two self-existent substances—Prakriti and Purusha and there is no active connection between them. This system makes Purusha a mere looker on. But Brahman is neither a mechanic nor a mere looker on.

The Swarupa Lakshan deals with Brahman as He is apart from and irrespective of all relations to the world, while Tatastha Lakshan views Him in His relations to the world. God is related to the world through the all-pervading energy of Maya and when so viewed is known as Iswar, the Lord who is active, omniscient and omnipotent. He creates the universe, He regulates it, sustains it and destroys it. Thus all the characters of the creator may be attributed to Brahman when viewed in conjunction with adjunct of Maya, i.e. when He is Iswar. But when viewed without reference to Maya no attributes can be predicated of Brahman.

He is then devoid of all attributes ; He is then free from agency ; He is then pure and perfect in Himself.

Now final liberation can be attained by the knowledge of Brahman ; but the knowledge of Brahman is either relative or non-relative. The Vedantists hold the superiority of the non-relative knowledge to the relative knowledge, for, according to them the former is purely monistic and the latter dualistic in its character. The former may lead to final emancipation, and the latter can only elevate the faculties and powers of the person who contemplates Iswar but such contemplation will never enable him to cast off the trammels of dualistic existence

CHAPTER III

Cosmical Evolution

According to the Vedantists there are two primary kinds of existence viz Drasta and Drisya—the knowers and the knowables. The knowables are of two kinds—

- (a) Avyakrita (unmodified) Drisya—it is what is known as Prakriti—the evolvent but not the evolute. It

is the initial unevolved energy. It is the root of the phenomenal changes of the world but it itself unchanged.

(b) Vyakrita (modified) Drisya—it includes—

- (i) The internal organs of knowledge *i.e.* mind and understanding.
- (ii) The organs of sense perception—Jnanendriyas.
- (iii) The motor-impulses—Pranas.
- (iv) The organs of movement—Karmendriyas.

(v) The objects of sense perception.*

Avyakrita or prakriti may be identified with Maya. It has within it three distinct principles and from the continuous and conjoint action of these arise the different classes of Vyakrita. These principles are—

- (i) Sattya, the illumination of principle—it tends towards complete manifestation
- (ii) Rajas, the dynamical principle—it tends towards activity

(iii) Tamas, the statical principle
—it tends towards inanity

Prakriti under the preponderating influence of Tamas produces the five gross elements, the Mahabhutas which correspond to the five-fold aspects of sense perception—sound, touch, sight, taste and smell. These gross elements, again, under the influence of Sattwa give rise severally to the organs of perception. The internal organ is the product of the above elements when they act conjointly under the preponderating influence of Sattwa, and according to its functional difference, sometimes it is known as Buddhi or understanding and sometimes as Manas or mind. Those five elements again when under the influence of Rajas produce severally the organs of movement, and when they act conjointly under the same influence, they give rise to Pranas or motor impulses.

“In the gross material objects there is manifestly a preponderance of inanity or in complete manifestation (tamas) but they must not be identified with the formative

elements themselves , in these gross objects there is an intermixture of all the five elements, their growth being due to a process of composition known as Panchikarana, so that each of the elements enters into the composition of every material object , the character of the object (solidity, liquidity &c) is however determined by the nature of the preponderating element in its composition "

CHAPTER IV

Brahman and World

We have seen that the reality of the world is derived from Brahman who alone is the real being. Hence it follows that the world is unreal when we consider it apart from Brahman. Brahman is the constitutive cause of the world and the operation of Maya produces the apparent diversities of the world.

Empirical and Transcendental Realism

What do the Vedantists mean when they hold that this world is not real? They

draw a distinction between empirical reality, and transcendental reality, between Vyavaharika and Paramarthic reality . The object of perception must have an existence—it can not be called non-existent . The world is an object of perception , therefore it is existent, it is real. Real it is but in the empirical sense. That which is permanent and immutable is real and unreal is that which is temporary and mutable . Let us take dream as an instance of unreal thing . Why do we regard as unreal the objects perceived in a dream ? The object perceived in a dream are less permanent than those perceived in a wakeful state . Why the mirage is called unreal ? Because it vanishes away as soon as we approach the place where we imagined the existence of stream . Therefore it follows that that which has no break in the continuity of existence, that which is unalterably fixed is real . This world is characterised by its diversities, it is in constant flux . Hence it is called unreal . A thing whose existence is conditioned by

time and space and determined by relation to other things cannot be called real. The world is such a thing—it is mutable and contingent and hence it is unreal. The world has a reality but this reality is empirical and relative. To deny empirical reality even is to deny the very existence of knowledge. Absolute permanence is an index of absolute reality. All the objects of our experience which constitute the objective world are real in the phenomenal sense and unreal in the transcendental sense. Real because they are perceived and unreal because their existence is limited by the conditions of time and space. What you perceive must have an existence, a non-existent thing cannot be perceived. You may say that what you perceive is not a thing distinct from perception. But can there be any perception without an object to perceive? When you have perception you cannot but admit the existence of objects distinguished from perception. No one can identify the perception *itself* with the object perceived. The perception of

orange itself is not orange. Therefore it follows that the external world exists for we perceive it and we have no right to question the veracity of our own consciousness. But nevertheless the world is unreal* for reasons mentioned above. Hence while maintaining the non reality of the external world, the Vedantists do not deny its existence and do not ignore the testimony of consciousness. Brahman, the constitutive cause of the world is alone real, for He always remains the same amidst changes and diversities.

This world owes its reality to Brahman for, He alone is the real being and He is the sole essence of the world, but the world apart from Brahman has no reality of its own. "This world has come out of the Real, abides in the Real, and loses itself in the 'Real', it has no reality of its own (apart from what it derives from its constitutive cause), so, this entire world is real, but viewed apart (from its cause viz Brahman) is false.

This world is a conglomeration of pheno-

mena and they are associated together by the uniform laws of co existence and succession. These phenomena or appearances owe their emanation to the operation of Maya, the diversifying power of Brahman which gives rise to the apparent pulsations of duality and regulates their sequence, but they from their very nature, are incapable of being regarded as constituting His essence, whereas the substratum of reality supporting those appearances may very well be regarded as a communicated reality and, being immutable in its character is capable of being referred to Him "

Maya.

Maya is the divine power and it manifests itself in diverse ways. It is its nature to produce diversity in unity, to bring about Bheda out of Abheda. Maya is the dualising force by which an antithesis is established between the subject and the object, between the knowers and the knowables and such antithesis is the ground of experience in all its forms. Thus Maya

produces the antithesis between the subject and the object and when such antithesis is the primary condition of experience, it cannot be held that the objects of experience have no empirical reality. But they are transcendently unreal being the product of the operation of Maya. Similarly the world as a whole is real empirically but unreal transcendently.

The Summum bonum.

"When the soul realises the ultimate unreality of the distinction between the subject and the object, and fully comprehends the essential unity of itself, as well as of everything that seems to have a separate existence, with Brahman, its goal is reached, thence forward it does not become affected by the false imputations of mutations which are foreign to its own nature, and attains an everlasting infinitude in the infinitude of Brahman by participating in the pure existence, pure reason, and pure bliss which characterise divine nature. If we have

designated the origin of the differentiation of the subject from the object as the polarisation of *Māya* this last process which annuls that differentiation may be characterised as the neutralisation of *Māya*. So far as the individual who attains this stage is concerned Self-realisation being thus dependent on the realisation of ultimate unity which pre-supposes the pre-existence of difference, the apprehension of the world as a totality of separate entities in antithesis to individual souls similarly regarded as distinct from one another may, in one sense, be viewed as a moment in the attainment of self-realisation."

CHAPTER V

The Individual Soul and Absolute spirit

We have seen that Brahman appears in the aspect of *Iśvar* when viewed in relation to the world. But is not this conception of *Iśvar* dualistic? Does it not imply that Brahman is the all-powerful creator and

the Jivas, the individual souls are His creatures? How then to account for the non-dualism of Brahman? Ultimately there is no difference "In absolute reality there is neither the function of the creator nor the fact of the creation" One unconditioned being alone exists, and in him Iswar as well as the Jivas find their unification. The Jivas are so many ripples on the surface of the ocean of absolute reason, Iswar is the ocean itself as opposed and get related to the ripples, if the ocean seems to cast off the ripples, and make them look small the ripples in their turn seem to limit the ocean and trench upon its boundlessness. Relationing implies mutual limitation from the ultimate absolute standpoint there is one infinite ocean of pure reason in which all forms of difference lose themselves, when this point is reached, off goes the character of the individual soul by which he is an individual creature, as well as that character of Iswar by which he is the creator and there shines the indivisible infinite

beautiful reason free from all limitations and conditions "

Thus we see that the Vedantists endeavour to establish the ultimate identity between Iswat and individual souls. They hold that the Jivas are essentially non-different from Brahman and the understanding of this identity lead to salvation. But if Jivatman is identical with Paramatman and if Brahman is one and alone real then how to account for the manifold individuals? If the highest truth be "Thou art That", how then to account for the manifold "thous"? According to the Vedanta System the effect is contained in and essentially identical with the cause. Therefore this world of finite things and minds have been contained in and are essentially identical with the ground out of which they spring viz Brahman. They are in some sense a self evolution of what was contained potentially and necessarily in Brahman.

But the question still remains unanswered Why and how this self evolution of Brahman

takes place. Is it an act of free choice on the part of Brahman ? Does he freely and voluntarily resolve himself into this world of finite things ? Supposing he does so, we are still tempted to ask Does he enter fully and identify himself fully with the world of finite minds and things and thereby become finally immanent in it (Pantheism) ? Or does he resolve himself partly into the world of finite minds and things and thereby makes himself both immanent and transcendent (Theism) ? Or should we suppose that this world is not the product of free choice and will on the part of Brahman but arises out of some necessity inherent in his nature ? But how to account for this inherent necessity ? In short how to account for the non difference between the Jivas and the Brahman ? There are two different methods in which this non difference can be justified—one is rigorous non-dualism and the other conditional non dualism

, Bhedabhedavada

This view is ascribed to Aswarathya It

holds that the relation between the Jivas and the Brahman is a relation of both difference and non difference. The Jivas are not different from Brahman because they owe their origin to Brahman and share in his universal reason which constitutes his essence. At the same time they are different from Brahman, for, were not so, they all would be equally Omniscient and discrimination among them would be impossible. The relation of Brahman to Jivas is the same as the relation of sparks to the fire whence it originates. The sparks are neither totally different from nor absolutely identical with the fire whence they fly off. Thus there is diversity in unity and unity in diversity. This view is conditional non dualism. Now we proceed to give a brief account of another conditional non-dualism.

The view of Audulomi.

According to this view the relation is a relation of essential difference. Brahman is essentially different from his Jivas. It is the

duty of the Jivas to love him and trust him, to obey him and worship him. The union of mind with body has produced impurities in the soul which can be washed off only by self knowledge and devotional meditation and the self attains final liberation when it becomes purged off of all its impurities. This view has found its support in Anandavirtha and Baladeva Vidyabhusan, one of the followers of Chaitanya.

Absolute non-dualism

According to this view "Paramatman or the Supreme Spirit manifests itself under the various names and forms cast out by Maya in the aspect of individual souls." We must not maintain that the Jivas are the created effects of Brahman. If they be the created effects then certainly they must be mutable in their character and things which are mutable in character are not capable of attaining salvation which means conscious realisation of immortality. In that case there would be no distinction between salva-

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to remove the veil of ignorance, to cast off the limitations of time and space and thereby to realise yourself *i.e.* to attain salvation

This view is ascribed to Kasakritsna and the followers of Sankara

CHAPTER VI

Objections Considered

The theory of Absolute Non dualism and not of Conditional Non dualism is the true theory. There can be no such theory as qualified Non-dualism—it must be either dualism proper or monism proper—there can be no *via media*

Absolute non-dualism supports the essential non-difference between Brahman and the individual souls. If you deny this assertion, then the individual souls must be either co-eternal with Brahman or not co eternal. To admit them to be co eternal is to admit they exist side by side with Brahman from all eternity and if they so exist then certainly they limit the infinitude and universality of

tion and destruction, —salvation is not annihilation but realisation. The attainment of salvation which, is a conscious process is possible only on the knowledge that we are not created things and that we are not finite and mortal as we seem to be but rather we are immortal and potentially infinite. To secure salvation it is *necessary to realise* that we are but imperfect reproduction of the universal mind, that we are divinities upon earth appearing under the condition of time and space which can only fetter us so long as we remain ignorant of our own nature, just as a prince brought up in the house of a poor man remains unconscious of his royal dignity so long as he labours under the false impression that he is the poor man's son.

Let us realise our essential nature, let us know what we really are, and in cases like this, knowing is becoming. Know what you are and you will become what you are. The knowledge of the true nature of the inner spirit, of the essential non difference between Jivatman and Paramatman will enable you

to remove the veil of ignorance, to cast off the limitations of time and space and thereby to realise yourself *as* to attain salvation

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God, but God is infinite and unlimited. Even supposing the co-eternal existence of Brahman and the Jivas, may we not further ask the question: Is there any co-eternal relation between them? You must admit such relation for you cannot deny it. But how can there be a relation between Brahman and objects other than himself? And if there be any such relation, does it not limit the absoluteness of God? Then again if the difference between the individual souls and Brahman be ultimate and real, then wherein lies the possibility of salvation.

Thus we see that individual souls cannot be co-eternal with the Supreme Spirit. Should we then suppose that they had a beginning in time and that they owed their existence to the creative activity of God? But a thing which has a beginning must have an end, and hence salvation of a created thing is impossible. If it be urged that rational souls from their very nature are indestructible we may urge also with equal force that for the same reason they cannot be

created, that they are free from origination. Creation of a thing means its appearance under the conditions of time and space, withdraw the conditions, it will be extinguished. Hence immortality of soul is not consistent with the denial of its eternal existence.

Then again it may be asked why Brahman created the individual souls at a particular point of time and not at another? If God has remained from all eternity without the world, how did the need of a world arise? Was there any defect of his being without the world? If so why did he not feel the defect before? Creation implies purpose, but can God, who is ever perfect have any purpose directed towards an unrealised end? Did he create the world out of compassion as the Nyāyikas support but this view also has been refuted.

Again it may be urged Why this inequality in human happiness? Why all men are not equally happy? Certainly it must be admitted that this difference is due to the difference existing in the conditions and capacities

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purpose of this enquiry, be ignored " "When the Vedantists assert the essential identity of Iswar and the Jivas, they cast aside the relative attributes which are imputed to them as they have only a relative existence, and maintain that they are identical in their essence which consists of pure existence, pure reason and pure bliss. Apparent limitation is but a creation of Maya, it has no immutable reality, for although Maya spins out a number of fleeting adjuncts which seem to differentiate the individual souls severally from one another, and collectively from the Supreme Spirit, the real substratum around which these adjuncts appear to cling for their support is furnished by the indivisible and infinite reason which is without a second "

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and susceptibilities characterising different individuals from the very beginning. If the individual souls are created by God then why this difference and if there be such difference, then how to justify and explain the impartial and merciful nature of Brahman ? You can not avoid the difficulty by saying that these differences of the present life are effects of difference in actions performed in past lives ; for, what is necessary to explain and to justify is not the present difference but the original differences.

Therefore, we come to the conclusion that Dualism or even Conditional Dualism cannot be supported. But how the individual souls can be essentially identical with Brahman who is the omniscient, omnipotent and all-pervading Lord of the universe ? "The Vedantists maintain that the non-difference which they seek to establish between the individual souls and God is grounded on the unity of essence after elimination of the elements of difference as relative adjuncts which may, for the